

GENERAL MERRILL A. MCPEAK
LEADERSHIP AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE

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A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF
THE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIRPOWER STUDIES
FOR COMPLETION OF GRADUATION REQUIREMENTS

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIRPOWER STUDIES
AIR UNIVERSITY
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

JUNE 2001

Report Documentation Page		
Report Date 01JUN2001	Report Type N/A	Dates Covered (from... to) -
Title and Subtitle General Merrill A. McPeak Leadership and Organizational Change	Contract Number	
	Grant Number	
	Program Element Number	
Author(s) Bussiere, Thomas A.	Project Number	
	Task Number	
	Work Unit Number	
Performing Organization Name(s) and Address(es) School of Advanced Airpower Studies Air University Maxwell AFB, AL	Performing Organization Report Number	
Sponsoring/Monitoring Agency Name(s) and Address(es)	Sponsor/Monitor's Acronym(s)	
	Sponsor/Monitor's Report Number(s)	
Distribution/Availability Statement Approved for public release, distribution unlimited		
Supplementary Notes The original document contains color images.		
Abstract		
Subject Terms		
Report Classification unclassified	Classification of this page unclassified	
Classification of Abstract unclassified	Limitation of Abstract UU	
Number of Pages 84		

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Acknowledgements

I want to thank Dr James S. Corum and Dr. Harold R. Winton for their time and patience.

Their support and editorial comments kept my effort on track and sharpened my writing and analytical ability.

Most importantly, I want to thank my wife, Barbara, and children, Alexandra, Joseph, Christopher, and Danielle. Their patience and understanding throughout this year of study helped ensure my success in completing this project.

Abstract

This study examines the effectiveness of General Merrill A. McPeak's leadership as chief of staff of the Air Force in relation to the major command, composite wing, and objective wing reorganizations. In order to establish analytical criteria with which to evaluate General McPeak's decisions and actions, this thesis also establishes a chief of staff organizational leadership model. Having established the organizational leadership model, the study examines General McPeak's leadership in three case studies: the major command reorganization, the resurrection of composite wings, and the initiation of the objective wing structure. Each case study consists of three sections: a brief history of the organizational concept, an assessment of the input and output criteria from the organizational leadership model, and finally an analysis of General McPeak's leadership. The case studies were selected because they represented the most fundamental changes to the Air Force during McPeak's era as chief of staff. The major command case explores how the Air Force simplified and streamlined its organizational structure to prepare the service for a seamless transition from peace to war. The composite wing case examines a doctrinal shift away from the unitary wing structure, and the objective wing case explores the Air Force move to eliminate "stovepipe" organizations that reported off-base to an authority other than the installation commander. The study finds that the major command and objective wing reorganization were successful; however, the composite wing reorganization lacked proper analysis, planning, and attention to fiscal constraints. The

major command reorganization enhanced combat capability and improved peacetime efficiency. The objective wing structure was revolutionary in nature and represented McPeak's vision of one base, one wing, one boss. Overall, the study concludes that General McPeak's leadership and vision significantly and positively improved the organizational structure of the Air Force.

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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

It has been said that the real crux of generalship is organization and not tactics... A disorderly mob is no more an army than a heap of building material is a house. Men, Units, Groups, and Commands—all must be arranged and organized before efficiency and expediency can be achieved.

General Henry “Hap” Arnold
General of the Air Force, 23 January 1940

General Merrill A. McPeak became the chief of staff of the Air Force in October 1990. Less than a year later, he announced that the time had come to reorganize the Air Force. As chief of staff, McPeak restructured the Air Force to meet the demands of national security interests, while adjusting to the end of the Soviet threat and increasing fiscal constraints. General McPeak led the service through a radical reorganization that attempted to take the Air Force back to the simplicity of its pre-1947 organizational roots.

Since the days of Billy Mitchell, airpower advocates taught that airpower was “indivisible” and should be treated as a unified whole, a tenet used by General McPeak when he initiated the Air Force reorganization.¹ In re-shaping the Air Force, General McPeak restructured the major commands, resurrected the composite wing structure, and reorganized the basic operational wing structure into “objective” wings. Although many factors influenced the Air Force reorganization, one critical component was the effectiveness of the chief of staff’s leadership.

This work examines the effectiveness of General McPeak’s leadership as chief of staff of the Air Force in relation to the major command, composite wing, and objective wing reorganization. In order to establish analytical criteria with which to evaluate his decisions and actions, this thesis establishes a chief of staff organizational leadership model. The fundamental issue confronts the following question: Did General McPeak’s

¹ Warren A. Trest, *Air Force Roles and Missions: A History* (Washington D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1998), 240-60.

leadership as chief of staff of the Air Force contribute significantly and positively to the Air Force reorganization?

The material for this study comes from a wide variety of sources. The primary material includes official records and correspondence, interviews with key participants, published doctrine, and air staff briefings.² These materials will be supplemented by a variety of secondary books, research papers, and articles. Essentially, there is sufficient material available to form the basis for a sound analysis.

This study examines the leadership, diagnostic, and action skills essential to a chief of staff when guiding and controlling the complex organizational activities of the Air Force. Of all the duties and responsibilities of the chief of staff, determining the organizational structure of the Air Force is one over which General McPeak had the greatest degree of influence. By law, the chief of staff has the authority to determine the most effective way to organize the Air Force.³ On most other policy, program, and budget decisions, the chief of staff has a significant amount of input; but, essentially, he is implementing the decisions of the president, congress, and the secretary of defense. A significant objective of leadership at the chief of staff level involves developing and maintaining an organizational structure as an integrated system aimed toward mission accomplishment.

For objective analysis, this thesis proposes an organizational leadership model with which to evaluate the chief of staff. Having established an organizational leadership model, it next examines General McPeak's leadership in three case studies. Each case study consists of three sections: a brief history of the organizational concept, an assessment of the input and output criteria from the organizational leadership model, and finally an analysis of General McPeak's leadership.

The sections of each case focus on the particular issues associated with organizational change and leadership. The historical section examines the background, motivating contextual issues, and the changing conditions that contributed to the requirement for an organizational change. The assessment section of each case attempts

² The Air Force Historical Research Agency located at Maxwell Air Force Base Ala. has a significant number of official records and correspondence relating to General McPeak's tenure as USAF Chief of Staff, 1990-1994.

to determine the actions that occurred during implementation that represented the fundamental properties of each organizational change. The leadership analysis section compares the criteria established in the chief of staff model and General McPeak's leadership in each organizational case.

The organization studies were selected because they represent the most fundamental changes to the Air Force made during the McPeak era.⁴ The major command case was chosen to explore how the Air Force simplified and streamlined its organizational structure to prepare the service for the transition from peace to war. The composite wing case—units combining the various aircraft necessary to form complete mission packages—represented a doctrinal shift away from the single-frame wing structure. The objective wing case was selected to explore the Air Force move to eliminate “stovepipe” organizations that reported off-base to an authority other than the installation commander.⁵

The case studies provide a wide variety of organizational changes with which to evaluate General McPeak's leadership. The leadership factors involved in each of the three cases should provide a useful comparison with the chief of staff organizational leadership model. Limiting an analysis of General McPeak's leadership to three case studies omits by design other significant events that occurred during General McPeak's tenure as chief of staff.⁶ Despite this limitation, sufficient evidence is available to support a through analysis and conclusion. One means of analysis is to compare the

³ U.S. Code: Title 10, Chapter 805, Section 8033, Chief of Staff, January 2000.

⁴ J. R. Wilson, “US Air Force Reorganization: A Response to Changing Times.” *International Defense Review*, December 1991, 1311-13.

⁵ During General McPeak's tenure as chief of staff, other organizational changes occurred that are not covered in this thesis. They include the reorganization of the air staff, numbered air forces, and the reduction of the Air Force Communications Command and Air Force Intelligence Command to field operating agencies (FOA).

⁶ Other significant events included: the assignment of women to combat functions, the roles and missions debate, changes to the officer assignment system, the inclusion of homosexuals in the military, the Quality Air Force initiative, and the Air Force uniform and patch changes. For more information regarding General McPeak's views on these and other issues during his tenure as Chief of Staff, see the Oral History Interview of General Merrill McPeak by Dr. George M. Watson, Jr. and Major Robert White, 19 December 1994. Typed transcript, K239.0512-2138 C. 1, in USAF Collection, AFHRA.

results of the three organizational cases to determine the relationship between General McPeak's leadership and the success or failure of the Air Force reorganization.

In the conclusion, the thesis offers some thoughts concerning the implications of the findings on leadership. More significantly, it attempts to provide the Air Force a model for understanding the role of leadership at the top levels of the Air Force.

Chapter 2

Chief of Staff Organizational Leadership Model

Perhaps in His wisdom the Almighty is trying to show us that a leader may chart the way, may point out the road, but that many leaders and many peoples must do the building.

Eleanor Roosevelt

The quality of leadership at the top of an organization is a critical determinant of its success or failure. As the senior uniformed Air Force officer, the chief of staff has the responsibility to lead, direct, and integrate a complex organization.⁷ He must deal with both internal and external organizational demands and conditions. The ability to guide and control conditions within the service requires an understanding of a variety of factors, such as the way the service is organized, trained, and equipped.⁸ Additionally, several factors external to the Air Force influence the chief of staff organizational leadership process. They include both domestic and international political, economic, social, technological, and military forces.⁹

The chief of staff must deal with the above issues both as they relate to the current situation and to their long-term implications for the service and the national defense. The chief of staff must ensure service organizational objectives are established and communicated, plans and policies developed, proper equipment developed and fielded, and personnel recruited and trained.¹⁰ The nature of leadership at this level is complex

⁷ U.S. Code: *Title 10, Chapter 805, Section 8033 Chief of Staff*, January 2000.

⁸ U.S. Code: *Title 10, Chapter 805, Section 8032 The Air Staff*, January 1998.

⁹ Richard L. Hughes, Robert C. Ginnett, and Gordan J. Curphy, *Leadership: Enhancing the Lessons of Experience* (Boston, Mass.: R.R. Donnelley & Sons Company, 1993), 336.

¹⁰ Berlain Hatfield, "Strategic Leadership Development: An Operation Domain Application" (Research Report no. 97-0607M. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Command and Staff College, 1997), 9.

and difficult.¹¹

This chapter first examines the chief of staff duties and responsibilities prescribed by US Code Title 10, sections 8013, 8032, 8033, and 151. It then examines the organizational leadership skills essential to a chief of staff. An equally important aspect of leadership is an examination of the characteristics essential to effective organizations. The task then is to develop an organizational leadership model that provides the criteria by which to evaluate General McPeak's leadership decisions during the Air Force reorganization.

Chief of Staff Duties

The chief of staff performs the duties and responsibilities outlined in US Code Title 10, section 8033(see appendix A).¹² The president appoints the chief of staff of the Air Force with the consent of the Senate. The chief of staff is appointed for four years and serves at the pleasure of the president. In a time of national emergency or war, the president may appoint the chief of staff for an additional four-year term. The chief of staff performs his duties under the authority, direction, and control of the secretary of the Air Force. One of the major responsibilities of the chief of staff is to preside over the air staff (see appendix B).¹³

In addition to presiding over the air staff, the chief of staff personally works with the secretary of the Air Force. He advises the secretary on any plans and recommendations from the air staff and is responsible to keep the secretary fully informed of any significant military issues affecting the duties and responsibilities of the secretary (see appendix C).¹⁴ The secretary of the Air Force, appointed by the president, has the authority to conduct all the affairs of the Department of the Air Force. The chief of staff must closely coordinate any plans for organizational changes to the Air Force with the secretary.

¹¹ Joseph A. Olmstead, *Executive Leadership*. (Houston, Tex.: Gulf Publishing Co., 2000), 24.

¹² U.S. Code: *Title 10, Chapter 805, Section 8033, Chief of Staff*, January 2000.

¹³ The chief of staff presides over the air staff. U.S. Code Title 10 prescribes the air staff duties: *Title 10, Chapter 805 Section 8032, The Air Staff*, January 1998.

¹⁴ The secretary of the Air Force duties are prescribed by US Code Title 10: *Title 10, Chapter 805 Section 8013, Secretary of the Air Force*, January 1998.

The Air Force also must be able to fulfill the current and future operational requirements of the specified combatant commands. The functioning and efficiency of the Air Force requires close coordination with the other services to ensure the policies and programs of the Air Force are consistent with the national security objectives and policies of the secretary of defense and the president. To this end, the chief of staff also performs duties prescribed for him as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff¹⁵ and the Armed Forces Policy Council.¹⁶

The chief of staff organizes the Air Force to accomplish its operational mission. This is not a simple undertaking. The chief of staff is responsible to organize, train, and equip the service. His leadership must be capable of integrating these activities so they function as an organized system. To be effective, the chief of staff must understand both the internal affairs of the organization and the external situation faced by it. Such effectiveness also requires some very specific organizational skills.

Organizational Leadership

Leadership becomes increasingly complex as one moves up the chain of authority in any large organization. The problems are larger, the issues more complex, and new orientations emerge. The chief of staff is concerned with building and guiding a multi-echelon, hierarchical organization to meet the needs of nation. This involves ensuring the organization is competent to perform its mission. Furthermore, it involves coordinating the interdependent activities of the Air Force so that they fit together and contribute effectively to the mission. At this level, one finds a distinct quality of senior leadership.¹⁷

Leadership is fundamental to the Air Force mission. As General Omar Bradley once said: “Leadership is intangible, and therefore no weapon ever designed can replace

¹⁵ See Appendix D for U.S. Code: Title 10, Chapter 805, Section 151, Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 2000.

¹⁶ The Armed Forces Policy Council advises the secretary of defense on matters of broad policy relating to the armed forces and shall consider and report on such matters as the secretary of defense directs. For more information see US Code: Title 10, Section 171.

¹⁷ For research on the operation domain and the Stratified Systems Theory Model on the identification and development of effective leadership see: Berlain Hatfield, “Strategic Leadership Development: An Operation Domain Application”(Research Report no. 97-0607M. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Command and Staff College, 1997).

it.”¹⁸ There are many definitions and descriptions of leadership; however, most agree that leadership is the ability to influence a process toward the accomplishment of a goal.

¹⁹ The chief of staff must have a vision and develop a plan to realize that vision. He then must take action to implement his plan to accomplish Air Force organizational objectives.

In assessing leadership, it is necessary to distinguish between leadership and management. In the words of Peter Drucker and Warren Bennis, two noted authors on the subject, “Management is doing things right; leadership is doing the right things.”²⁰ Leadership and management complement each other. One may be a good manager, but not a good leader; but one can probably not be an effective leader in today’s Air Force without being also being an effective manager. Management is inherent in leadership.

Organizational Leadership Model

This study evaluates General McPeak’s leadership using an organizational leadership model. The model takes into account the input variables of leadership, diagnostic, and action skills essential to a chief of staff. The output variables include the organizational attributes of adaptability, integration, and operational proficiency.

Organizational Leadership Model Input Variables

The input variables of the chief of staff organizational leadership model fall into three categories: skills of leadership, diagnosis, and action. Effective leadership at the chief of staff level requires more than just a foundational base of leadership characteristics. It requires the development of specific skills over years of operational line, staff, and professional military educational experience. The effectiveness of the chief of staff’s actions is related directly to his experience, his competence, his grasp of the situation, and his willingness to initiate change when needed. In sum, effective leadership at this level requires the ability to take action according to the demands of the situation.

¹⁸ Robert L. Taylor and William E. Rosenbach, ed. *Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence*. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996), 1.

¹⁹ Richard L. Hughes, Robert C. Ginnett, and Gordan J. Curphy. *Leadership: Enhancing the Lessons of Experience*. (Boston, Mass.: R.R. Donnelley & Sons Company, 1993), 6.

Leadership Skills

A leader must have several basic leadership attributes. These characteristics are developed and matured through experience and provide the leader an internal compass to guide his decisions and actions through life; they include the qualities of integrity, vision, and courage.²¹ The chief of staff must have integrity. He must also provide the Air Force a long-term organizational vision and have the moral courage to implement that vision. A chief of staff should demonstrate these characteristics in order to effectively guide and direct the Air Force. These characteristics provide the leadership variables of the chief of staff organizational leadership model.




Figure 1. Leadership Input Variables

Diagnostic Skills

The essential prerequisite to any action is an accurate diagnosis of the problem. Diagnostic skills involve observation, analysis, and assessment of both the internal and external factors influencing the organization. This diagnosis requires the ability to identify critical elements of the situation, while disregarding the many factors that may be present but are not essential to the major issue.²²

²⁰ Quoted in Stephen R. Covey, *The 7 Habits of Highly Effective People: Powerful Lessons in Personal Change* (New York, N.Y.: Simon and Schuster, 1989), 101.

²¹ Leadership attributes compiled from the following sources: Thomas A. Bussiere. "Personal Leadership Action Plan" (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Command and Staff College, 2000), Official Records and Correspondence of USAF Chief of Staff, Gen McPeak on Leadership, 23 Sep 93, K168.03-795 Part 1, in USAF Collection, AFHRA.

²² Joseph A. Olmstead, *Executive Leadership*. (Houston, Tex.: Gulf Publishing Co., 2000), 20.



Figure 2. Diagnostic Input Variables

To accomplish an accurate diagnosis, it is necessary to understand exactly what the issue is. Accurate diagnosis is essential to effective leadership. Proper diagnosis includes observing both the internal factors and the external situation, making an analysis of those factors, and then assessing the available courses of action. Indeed, change can come only through action. It is one thing to know what should be accomplished and quite another to get it done. Effective organizational leadership requires both diagnosis and action.

Action Skills

Action skills are the skills that allow leaders to intervene in situations to alter an existing situation. They involve such abilities as developing a strategy and manipulating the conditions to optimize the organizational structure.²³ For any given situation, the chief of staff has several actions that he may take to solve Air Force organizational problems. Since each organizational leadership challenge is unique, skill is required in selecting and implementing the action that is most appropriate for the specific situation.²⁴

²³ Ibid., 21.

²⁴ For the principal characteristics desired in Air Force organizations see: Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 38-1.

Manpower and Organization. June 1996.




Figure 3. Action Input Variables

Effective leadership requires the flexibility to take action and the capacity to choose the best alternative from a range of alternatives that will best position the organization for success.

Organizational Leadership Model Output Variables

The chief of staff is concerned with improving the organizational structure of the Air Force. Effectiveness in achieving organizational objectives is measured by the Air Force's ability to cope with, adapt, and control the operational environment. For the Air Force to adapt successfully, it requires an organizational structure with the following characteristics: adaptability, integration, and operational proficiency.²⁵




Figure 4. Organizational Leadership Model Output Variables

²⁵ Adapted from Joseph A. Olmstead, *Executive Leadership*. (Houston, Tex.: Gulf Publishing Co., 2000), 38-42, and Richard L. Hughes, Robert C. Ginnett, and Gordan J. Curphy. *Leadership: Enhancing the Lessons of Experience*. (Boston, Mass.: R.R. Donnelley & Sons Company, 1993), 319-30.

Adaptability

Adaptability is the capacity of the organization to react to the changing demands of the operational environment. To succeed, the organization must be sufficiently flexible to adapt readily when the situation demands it. The organization must have the structures and processes that will enable it to adapt to the changes in the operational environment.

Integration

Integration ensures sustained coordination and cooperation. Functions and operations of the organization must fit together so that they work toward a common goal and do not operate at cross-purposes with one another.

Operational Proficiency

Operational proficiency measures the organizations technical and professional competence to successfully execute the tasks required by the operational environment.

To examine General McPeak's leadership during the Air Force reorganization, this study uses an analysis of organizational leadership skills as well as the characteristics essential to an effective organization. This will provide an analysis of General McPeak's leadership actions in light of the outcomes of those actions.

Criteria for Evaluating General McPeak's Leadership

Functioning at the chief of staff level demands integration between the internal and the external environments. The Air Force organizational structure must meet current operational requirements as well as the requirements forecasted 10-20 years into the future. Success at this level requires the ability to think abstractly, to perform a high level of analysis, and understand the operational environment. The chief of staff must be able to assimilate, analyze, and incorporate information from the political, economic,

social, technical, and military sources. He must analyze the influence of those forces on the Air Force's current and future organizational structures.²⁶

Chief of Staff Organizational Leadership Model

The model to evaluate the chief of staff incorporates the input variables of leadership, diagnostic, and action skills essential to a chief of staff. These factors act on the structure of the Air Force. To assess the effectiveness of the chief of staff's actions, one examines the output variables of adaptability, integration, and operational proficiency. The schematic below depicts in visual form the action of the entire model.




Figure 5. Chief of Staff Organizational Leadership Model

²⁶ Berlain Hatfield, "Strategic Leadership Development: An Operation Domain Application" (Research Report no. 97-0607M. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Command and Staff College, 1997), 9.

Using the chief of staff organizational leadership model outlined above, this thesis examines General McPeak's leadership by assessing the input variables that initiated each of the three reorganization actions and the output variables to assess the organizational outcome of those actions.²⁷ The input variables constitute the criteria to measure the appropriateness of General McPeak's decision to initiate the reorganization. The output variables establish the criteria used to evaluate the effectiveness of each reorganization action. Although the criteria selected are not comprehensive, they do allow a reasonable assessment of organizational effectiveness.²⁸ The use of both leadership and organizational variables offer a variety of criteria to assess General McPeak's leadership decisions and the outcome of those decisions.

The study will assess each of the three case studies with the following criteria:

Input Criteria:

1. Leadership skills—Did General McPeak exhibit the fundamental leadership attributes of integrity, vision, and courage?
2. Diagnostic skills—Did General McPeak accurately observe, analyze, and assess the issue taking into account both internal and external factors?
3. Action skills—Did General McPeak develop a strategy and take action to manipulate the organizational structure?

Output Criteria:

1. Adaptability—Did the reorganization action increase the capacity of the Air Force to react flexibly to changing demands of the operational

²⁷ Chief of Staff Organizational Leadership Model synthesized from the following sources: Richard L. Hughes, Robert C. Ginnett, and Gordan J. Curphy. *Leadership: Enhancing the Lessons of Experience*. (Boston, Mass.: R.R. Donnelley & Sons Company, 1993), 6-11, 69-82. Berlain Hatfield, "Strategic Leadership Development: An Operation Domain Application" (Research Report no. 97-0607M. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Command and Staff College, 1997). Joseph A. Olmstead, *Executive Leadership*. (Houston, Tex.: Gulf Publishing Co., 2000), 2-8, 24-32, 38-42, 225-239. Robert L. Taylor, and William E. Rosenbach, ed. *Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence*. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996), 2-4, 167-70.

environment?

2. Integration—Did the reorganization action enhance the function of the organizational structure of the Air Force to ensure sustained coordination and cooperation?
3. Operational proficiency—Did the reorganization action add to the technical and professional competence of the Air Force to execute successfully the tasks required by the operational environment?

Conclusion

The study examines the leadership attributes, diagnostic skills, and action skills essential to a chief of staff when guiding and controlling the complex organizational activities of the Air Force. The organizational leadership model establishes the criteria by which to evaluate General McPeak's reorganization actions.

The study will now examine General McPeak's leadership in three case studies: the major command reorganization, the resurrection of composite wings, and finally the initiation of the objective wing structure. Each case study consists of three sections: a brief history of the organizational concept, an assessment of the input and output criteria from the organizational leadership model, and finally an analysis of General McPeak's leadership.

²⁸ Richard L. Hughes, Robert C. Ginnett, and Gordan J. Curphy. *Leadership: Enhancing the Lessons of Experience*. (Boston, Mass.: R.R. Donnelley & Sons Company, 1993), 74-9.

Chapter 3

The Major Command Reorganization

What we were trying to do was organize the Air Force in the best way to meet any kind of threat or any budgetary circumstance.

General McPeak

General Merrill A. McPeak

During his thirty-seven years in the Air Force, General McPeak developed his leadership skills through various operational, staff, and command experiences. McPeak entered the Air Force in 1957 through the San Diego State College Reserve Officer Training Corps program.²⁹ After completing pilot training, he held a variety of both operational fighter and staff assignments in the United States and overseas. After a two-year assignment flying as a pilot on the Air Force Air Demonstration Team, McPeak experienced combat for the first time in Vietnam. While in Vietnam, he served as the operations officer and later as the commander of a forward air controller unit. General McPeak's professional military education included attending the Armed Forces Staff College, the National War College, and a military fellowship with the Council on Foreign Relations in New York City. McPeak commanded at the squadron, group, wing, numbered air force, and major command level. In October 1990, President Bush selected General McPeak to serve as the 14th chief of staff of the United States Air Force. When he became chief of staff, McPeak's competence, grasp of the situation, and his willingness to initiate change when needed had been influenced by his experiences throughout his Air Force career. General McPeak retired in November 1994.

Major Command Historical Background

During General McPeak's tenure as chief of staff, the Air Force witnessed the most extensive changes to its organizational structure since its establishment as a separate

²⁹ See appendix E for the United States Air Force *Biography of General Merrill A. McPeak*. Available from http://www.af.mil/news/biographies/mcpeak_ma.html.

service in 1947.³⁰ The restructuring efforts reduced the number of operational and support major commands from 13 to eight.³¹ These eight major commands make up the operational and support organizational structure of the Air Force below the headquarters air staff.³² The Air Force assigns specific responsibilities to each major command based on an operational or support basis in the United States, and on a geographical basis overseas.

Beginning in 1990, General McPeak began to realign the major command organizational structure. The primary goal of reorganizing the MAJCOMs was to increase combat capability through airpower integration, develop a clear and simple organizational structure, and unify command. McPeak also wanted to enhance peacetime efficiencies, but his primary concern was combat effectiveness.³³

When General McPeak became chief of staff, the Air Force had 13 major air commands (see figure 6). Seven were operational commands: Strategic Air Command (SAC), Tactical Air Command (TAC), Military Airlift Command (MAC), Air Force Space Command (AFSPACE), Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC), U.S. Air Forces Europe (USAFE), and Pacific Air Forces (PACAF). The other six commands provided support to the operational commands: Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC), Air Force Systems Command (AFSC), Air Force Communications Command (AFCC), Air University (AU), Air Training Command (ATC), and Electronic Security Command (ESC). During the McPeak reorganization, nine of thirteen major commands would see significant change.

³⁰ Bernard C. Nalty, ed., *Winged Shield, Winged Sword: A History of the United States Air Force, Vol II*. (Washington D.C.: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1997), 547.

³¹ Although the original McPeak reorganization plan called for nine major commands, the service realigned the Air Force Intelligence Command into a field operating agency in October 1993.

³² See appendix F for a list of Air Force major commands, field operating agencies, and direct reporting units as of October 2000.

³³ Gen. Merrill A. McPeak, *Selected Works 1990–1994*, (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1995), 83.




Figure 6. MAJCOM Structure before Reorganization (From Official Records of USAF Chief of Staff, Briefing Covering All Areas of Air Force Reorganization, 01 Jan 94, K168.03-610, in USAF Collection, AFHRA, 5)

The MAJCOM reorganization resulted in six operational commands and two support commands (see figure 7). The reorganization affected all of the support major commands.

McPeak reduced the Air Force Communications Command to a field-operating agency.³⁴ The reorganization transferred the centralized functions of communications command to a field-operating agency and placed the rest of communications under the wing commander in the new objective wing.³⁵

The Air Force originally replaced Electronic Security Command with the Air Force Intelligence Command (AFIC) to consolidate all intelligence collection and analysis activity previously split among various agencies. However, in 1992 McPeak reduced AFIC to a field-operating agency.³⁶

One of the fundamental changes to the support commands occurred when McPeak merged Air Force Logistics Command and Air Force Systems Command into Air Force Material

³⁴ Oral History Interview of General Merrill McPeak by Dr. George M. Watson, Jr. and Major Robert White, 19 December 1994. Typed transcript, K239.0512-2138 C. 1, in USAF Collection, AFHRA, 13. McPeak, 84.

³⁵ See chapter 5 for the objective wing reorganization.

³⁶ Oral History, 16. McPeak, *Selected Works 1990–1994*, 85.

Command (AFMC). Air Force Material Command combined all the acquisition, support, and logistics support activities under one command. AFMC is responsible for integrated systems support—cradle to grave.³⁷

In July 1993, McPeak placed Air University under Air Training Command and designated ATC as Air Education and Training Command. During the same period, the Air Force consolidated aircrew training under AETC and transferred the associated bases to it from Air Combat Command and Air Mobility Command.³⁸




Figure 7. MAJCOM Structure after Reorganization (From Official Records of USAF Chief of Staff, Briefing Covering All Areas of Air Force Reorganization, 01 Jan 94, K168.03-610, in USAF Collection, AFHRA, 5)

In order to integrate airpower, the operational commands were reduced from seven to six.³⁹ McPeak reorganized Strategic Air Command, Tactical Air Command, and Military Airlift Command into two commands (Air Combat Command and Air Mobility Command). The reorganization resulted in Air Combat Command assigned responsibility for all the air force fighters, bombers, ICBMs,⁴⁰ reconnaissance aircraft, command and control aircraft, some tactical airlift, and some tankers.

Under this scheme, Air Combat Command provided nuclear capable forces to U.S. Strategic Command and supplied combat assets to the five geographic unified commands—the

³⁷ Oral History, 19.

³⁸ Ibid., 35.

³⁹ McPeak, *Selected Works 1990–1994*, 83-8.

⁴⁰ The Air Force transfers ICBM forces to Air Force Space Command in 1993.

Atlantic, European, Pacific, Southern, and Central Commands.⁴¹ Air Combat Command would therefore be responsible for “all the bomb dropping, bullet shooting, and support capabilities that must be integrated into modern air combat.”⁴²

Under McPeak’s reorganization, Air Mobility Command was given the mission of providing the armed forces worldwide strategic mobility. AMC was assigned the responsibility for strategic airlift (C-5 and C-141) and most of the tactical airlift (C-130) based in the United States. AMC is also responsible for rescue and aeromedical evacuation operations. The reorganization transferred most of the tanker force from Strategic Air Command to Air Mobility Command, with a small number of tankers remaining in Air Combat Command.⁴³

The primary theme of the operational command reorganization was the integration of airpower across the spectrum of air operations.⁴⁴ Under McPeak’s reorganization, Pacific Air Forces Command and U.S Air Force Europe Command assumed control of all Air Force assets stationed in-theater—airlift, fighters, bombers, tankers, reconnaissance, and support aircraft. The theater commanders were thus given authority over all operational and support aircraft required for conduct of their missions.

Established in 1990, Air Force Special Operations Command provided Air Force special operations forces for worldwide deployment and assignment to regional unified commands. Under McPeak’s reorganization, Air Force Special Operations Command was not significantly reorganized.⁴⁵

Organizational Leadership Model

Using the chief of staff organizational leadership model, I will examine General McPeak’s leadership by assessing the input variables that initiated the MAJCOM reorganization and the output variables to assess the organizational outcome of those actions.

Input Variables

During the MAJCOM reorganization, General McPeak exhibited the fundamental

⁴¹ McPeak, *Selected Works 1990–1994*, 93-7.

⁴² Ibid., 86.

⁴³ Oral History, 18 and McPeak, *Selected Works 1990–1994*, 87.

⁴⁴ McPeak, *Selected Works 1990–1994*, 88.

leadership attributes of integrity, vision, and courage. Throughout his tenure as chief of staff, General McPeak displayed integrity. On several occasions, McPeak impressed upon the Air Force that he would insist on integrity in all things.⁴⁶ “No matter how bad the problem, no matter how difficult the circumstances, the Air Force as an institution does not, will not, and cannot accept anything less than absolute, rock-solid, uncompromising integrity.”⁴⁷

The aggressive reorganization initiated by McPeak, built on the strengths the Air Force displayed in the Gulf War. His primary goal was to make operations central to all Air Force thinking. McPeak believed that operations should be the focus of the Air Force, and that he should reorganize the MAJCOMs to ensure the Air Force operated properly.⁴⁸ McPeak summed it up in the following statement:

We rebuilt the Air Force top to bottom and changed it in fundamental ways, which I think were important. The basis for all that was a desire on my part to make operations the centerpiece of the organization and to strengthen the role of operations. Operations is our product. Basically, I wanted to improve our product. We reorganized, restructured the Air Force top to bottom, and that is probably the most important thing.⁴⁹

The MAJCOM reorganization was a move to implement the new Air Force vision—*Global Reach, Global Power*. McPeak had five basic themes to his reorganization of the Air Force:⁵⁰

1. Decentralization of power from headquarters to operating units.
2. Bolstering the authority of lower-echelon commanders.
3. Streamlining the organization by removing links in the chain of command.
4. Consolidation of operations under a single commander.
5. Clarification of functional responsibilities.

McPeak believed he needed to restructure the Air Force for it to remain combat ready. McPeak said, “Our goal is to ensure that we are adapting, evolving...[and] well-organized, with

⁴⁵ McPeak, *Selected Works 1990–1994*, 83–8.

⁴⁶ Official Records of USAF Chief of Staff, Text of Gen McPeak Speech Delivered to Air Force Association Symposium, 26 Oct 90, Volume 1 of 3, 02 Feb 90 through 21 Dec 90, K168.03-141 V.1, in USAF Collection, AFHRA, 2.

⁴⁷ James W. Canan, “McPeak’s Plan.” *Air Force Magazine*, February 1991, 21.

⁴⁸ Oral History, 1.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 73.

⁵⁰ McPeak, *Selected Works 1990–1994*, 70.

the measure of merit being combat capability.”⁵¹

Before initiating the MAJCOM reorganization, General McPeak accurately observed, analyzed, and assessed the internal affairs and external situation facing the service. McPeak began to aggressively restructure the Air Force to meet the demands of national security interests with the end of the cold war and the emerging fiscal constraints. From 1991 to 1995, the Air Force budget declined steadily, from over \$91.2 billion to an average of \$77.3 billion.⁵² He summed up his thoughts in the following statement, “Make no mistake, international events and internal pressures will reshape the military services. The Air Force must adapt or go the way of the dinosaurs.”⁵³

As President Bush reminded the nation in 1990, “Our task today is to shape our defense capabilities to these changing strategic circumstances... We know that our forces can be smaller, but we would be ill served by forces that represent nothing more than a scaled-back or shrunken-down version of the ones we possess...what we need are not merely reductions—but restructuring” of America’s armed forces.⁵⁴ The developments in the international environment seemed to require a major look at the Air Force organizational structure.

The underlying assumptions of the national military strategy were key to McPeak’s reorganization plan. The Air Force envisioned the post-cold war threat being regional rather than global. McPeak saw that with a diminished nuclear threat, the Air Force required an increased conventional capability. He also saw that forward deployment of Air Force assets would need to be changed to a more “forward presence.”

Underpinning the budget trends was a bottom-up review of the post-cold war military forces and programs ordered by President Bill Clinton. The bottom-up review concluded “the United States had to maintain forces capable of fighting and winning two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts.”⁵⁵ Less than a year after becoming chief of staff, General McPeak started to initiate his organizational vision.

As chief of staff, General McPeak developed a workable strategy for the MAJCOM

⁵¹ James W. Canan, “McPeak’s Plan.” *Air Force Magazine*, February 1991, 18.

⁵² Jones, L. R. “The Pentagon Squeeze.” *Government Executive*, February 1992, 21-27.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 18.

⁵⁴ George L. Butler, “Adjusting to Post-Cold War Strategic Realities.” *Parameters*, Spring 1991, 2.

reorganization, and then took the appropriate action to manipulate the organizational structure. Starting in 1989, the Department of Defense began a major effort to reduce the defense structure in response to the end of the cold war and declining public support for a large defense budget. In an effort to mitigate congressional pressures, General McPeak began an aggressive effort to restructure the Air Force. McPeak stated, “I have no intention of presiding over the decline of the Air Force. Therefore, we will instead press for a top-to-bottom restructure as the best way to sustain our combat capability as we get smaller.”⁵⁶ McPeak’s initiatives resulted in unprecedented changes to the Air Force organizational structure in a very short period.

We are undergoing two kinds of change. The first kind relates to cuts in the defense budget. This change is affecting the size of the Air Force...we don’t exercise a lot of control over this category...The second category of change is that associated with our effort to restructure and reorganize the Air Force... This is change that affects the shape and style of our organization, and that’s something we do control...⁵⁷

A central management problem the Air Force faced was how it could maximize combat capability with decreasing budgets. McPeak was convinced he could do this in part by reducing overhead. He emphasized fewer, smaller headquarters, consolidated operations on fewer installations, and the elimination of non-essential functions.⁵⁸ McPeak’s MAJCOM reorganization focused on consolidating or eliminating support major command structures and integrating operational command structures.

The most dramatic change during the MAJCOM reorganization was the merger of Strategic Air Command, Air Training Command, and Military Airlift Command into two new command organizations: Air Combat Command and Air Mobility Command. Less than a year after becoming chief of staff, General McPeak noted that the line between tactical and strategic air power had been blurred. McPeak stated, “Airplanes have both tactical and strategic capability and should not be constrained by artificial distinctions.”⁵⁹ McPeak believed that the consolidation of all fighters, bombers, ICBMs, surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft into a single combat command would integrate airpower more effectively than the old TAC-SAC

⁵⁵ Warren A. Trest, *Air Force Roles and Missions: A History*, (Washington D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1998), 251.

⁵⁶ McPeak, *Selected Works 1990–1994*, 53.

⁵⁷ Official Records of USAF Chief of Staff, Briefing Covering All Areas of Air Force Reorganization, 01 Jan 94, K168.03-610, in USAF Collection, AFHRA, 3.

⁵⁸ Air Force Times, 5 November 1990.

structure. McPeak stated “the restructure of MAC, TAC, and SAC returns to fundamentals of airpower thinking—to the idea of a seamless web of aerospace power.”⁶⁰ Under McPeak’s reorganization, combat aircraft were no longer artificially separated by strategic or tactical command structures. All combat aircraft were integrated under one command structure.

Output Variables

McPeak’s MAJCOM reorganization increased the capacity of the Air Force to react to the changing demands of the operational environment. The MAJCOM reorganization enhanced the capabilities of the Air Force to meet emerging post cold-war threats and reduced budgets. With the new Air Combat Command and Air Mobility Command at the center of the reorganization, the Air Force was more able to respond rapidly to regional crises.⁶¹ Theater commanders now requested command aircraft through ACC and mobility forces from AMC.

Since the formation of the Air Force in 1947, TAC and SAC had traditionally conducted operations differently and somewhat competitively. Rivalry between the two organizations often impeded the effective application of airpower. Before the reorganization, aircraft in Strategic Air Command were primarily concerned with nuclear deterrence and aircraft in Tactical Air Command focused primarily on conventional applications. The creation of ACC eliminated the old SAC and TAC parochialisms, and integrated all combat air forces into one command structure. To succeed, a new ACC culture had to grow along with the new command structure.

The MAJCOM reorganization enhanced the ability of the Air Force to ensure sustained coordination and cooperation. The creation of Air Combat Command resulted in the integration of fighters, bombers, reconnaissance, airlift, and tanker support elements into a cohesive whole. Integrating conventional airpower was the primary reason for creating Air Combat Command.⁶² McPeak observed that there was a historical precedent for this action:

The idea of a single command to handle air combat forces goes all the way back to General Headquarters Air Force, which became operational in 1935. In fact,

⁵⁹ Trest, *Air Force Roles and Missions: A History*, 250.

⁶⁰ Wilson, J.R. “US Air Force Reorganization: A Response to Changing Times.” *International Defense Review*, December 1991, 1311.

⁶¹ McPeak placed the Inter-continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) in ACC. His original intention centered on the integration of all combat assets in one command. However, attempting to integrate conventional and nuclear warfighter into one command proved to be awkward and McPeak ended up transferring the ICBM force to space command in 1993.

⁶² Oral History, 18.

we had an Air Force Combat Command from 1941 to '43, controlling our stateside training and operational units. So, in some ways, the idea of an Air Combat Command is visionary, but in other ways, you could call it reactionary—back to the future—a return to a better way of organizing ourselves. It's taken a while, but today we are re-integrating air power into a cohesive whole.⁶³

The merger of Strategic Air Command and Tactical Air Command eliminated the artificial distinction between tactical and strategic airpower. It organized the combat air forces in peacetime to be ready for the integrated use of airpower during conflict. The results of the Gulf War showed how powerful airpower integration could be.

The MAJCOM reorganization also added to the technical and professional competence of the Air Force to successfully execute the tasks required by the operational environment. In the old command structure, weapons were budgeted and developed by Air Force Systems Command. Once the Air Force fielded a new weapon system, Air Force Logistics Command provided the logistical support. During the development process, lifecycle logistical requirements often had lower priority than system performance requirements. Under the new command structure, a single AFMC program manager would be in charge of the weapons system from “cradle to grave.”⁶⁴

The merger of Air Force Systems Command and Air Force Logistics Command into Air Force Material Command was fundamental to McPeak's vision. The new weapon system acquisition and support plan would now be under the jurisdiction of one organization. The new command structure established clear lines of accountability and made the command more responsive to the weapons systems users.⁶⁵

Analysis of General McPeak's Leadership

General McPeak initiated the most significant changes to the Air Force major command structure since the services creation. The MAJCOM reorganization enhanced the integration of combat forces and improved peacetime efficiency. It eliminated several MAJCOM headquarters staffs, consolidated functional activities, and strengthened the operational chain of command. All of this made the Air Force a more streamlined, agile combat service.

In its reorganization, the Air Force took advantage of the opportunities presented by the

⁶³ Air Force Magazine, July 1992, 48.

⁶⁴ Larry Grossman, “Streamlining for Leaner Times.” *Government Executive*, December 1991, 14 and Trest, 251.

defense reorientation and reorganized to enhance both its efficiency and effectiveness. The new organizational structure allowed the Air Force to maintain a smaller but highly capable force. The MAJCOM reorganization was designed to increase combat capability despite the 35 percent reduction in fighter aircraft, a 40 percent cut in bombers and a 50 percent drop in IBCMs in the decade starting in 1990.

The reorganization structured the peacetime Air Force for effective employment in combat. McPeak said, “We are moving from a period of high tension and high stability to one of low tension and low stability, ...we recognize that the world has changed and our defense needs with it...Air Force reorganization is the right move at the right time.” The result of the MAJCOM reorganization was a smaller but tougher Air Force.

General Joseph Ralston, as commander of ACC in 1994, stated “the Air Force is more capable [today] than in late 1990 when McPeak became chief and the Air Force was preparing to start the Persian Gulf War.”⁶⁵ The MAJCOM reorganization streamlined the Air Force’s chain of command and eliminated large chunks of bureaucracy. McPeak’s MAJCOM reorganization developed clear and simple operational and support organizational structures. The reorganization unified the operational command structure and enhanced peacetime efficiencies. The new MAJCOM organizational structure positively positioned the Air Force in the post cold-war environment during a period of declining budgets.

⁶⁵ Grossman, “Streamlining for Leaner Times,” 14.

⁶⁶ Air Force Times, 21 November 1994, 16.

Chapter 4

The Force Projection Composite Wing

The Air Force requires instant readiness to deploy anywhere in the world from the United States in the form of composite wings.

When the president says reach out and touch somebody, we can reach out and touch.

General McPeak

Historical Background

Force projection composite wings represented a significant change from the traditional peacetime basing structure and the combat employment of Air Force aircraft. The Air Force historically based aircraft in wings comprised of three squadrons equipped with identical aircraft to achieve economies of scale in logistics and training. When the Air Force deployed a force package, groups of dissimilar aircraft with differing capabilities assembled as a composite force package en route to the theater of operations.⁶⁷ In response to the emerging post cold-war threat, McPeak believed his force projection composite wings would be better suited to rapidly respond to regional crises around the world.

The idea of composite force units was not new to the Air Force.⁶⁸ During the initiation of the composite wing structure, the Air Force used five examples of a composite wing force to highlight the advantages attributed to their composite wing structure. They included the Navy's carrier air wing; the 7440th Provisional Composite Wing, which operated from Incirlik Air Base, Turkey during Operation Desert Storm; the 4404th Provisional Composite Wing that participated

⁶⁷ For a history of composite wings in the US Air Force see: Thomas S. Synder, "A Brief History of Composite Forces in the United States Air Force." Report no. M-U 40040-141. Ramstein Air Base, Germany.: USAFE, 1991.

⁶⁸ Although the Army Air Corp established composite wings after World War I, this study limits its reference to composite wings after the Air Force became a separate service in 1947. For a complete history of composite wings, see James E. Moschgat, "The Composite Wing: Back to the Future!" Report no. M-U 43998-1 M895c. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: School of Advanced Airpower Studies, May 1992.

in Operation Southern Watch; the Composite Air Strike Force (CASF) that operated from the United States from 1955 to 1973; and annual composite force training exercises.⁶⁹ The CASF was the Air Force's first use of a composite force structure after it became a separate service.

In July 1955, Tactical Air Command activated 19th Air Force as an operational headquarters for the newly created Composite Air Strike Force (CASF). The CASFs were designed to be integrated, self-supporting organizations that could deploy on short notice to a crisis area and operate until follow-on forces arrived. A CASF included counter-air fighters, air-to-ground attack aircraft, reconnaissance aircraft, bombers, tankers, and transports. The Air Force employed CASFs on several occasion during the late 1950s. In 1958, the Air Force deployed CASF Bravo to the Middle East in response to the unstable aftermath of a military coup in Iraq. Later in 1958, CASF X-Ray Tango deployed to Formosa to deter Chinese Communist aggression against Taiwan.⁷⁰ Although the US government recognized the advantages in crisis resolution made possible by rapidly deployable and flexible air forces, the Air Force inactivated Nineteenth Air Force and its CASFs in July 1973.⁷¹

Under McPeak's reorganization, the Air Force planned to establish force projection composite wings at Mountain Home Air Force Base (AFB), Idaho, Pope AFB, North Carolina, and Moody AFB, Georgia.⁷² The Air Force referred to these wings as composite wings because they contain a variety of aircraft types and capabilities at one base under the command of one commander. These capabilities are intended to allow the composite wing to either rapidly deploy as a wing or to be tailored to address a specific contingency. In theory, composite wings would be capable of autonomous operations after deployment or be subordinate to a higher authority in theater.⁷³

⁶⁹ United States General Accounting Office. *Air Force Organization: More Assessment Needed Before Implementation Force Projection Composite Wings*, Report no. M-U 41026-147 93-44 (Washington, D.C.: Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, May 1993), 15.

⁷⁰ Robert Frank Futrell, *Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, vol. 1, 1907-1960* (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air university Press, 1989), 450.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 611-12.

⁷² The plan for a composite wing at Moody AFB was delayed indefinitely because aircraft from Homestead AFB relocated to Moody after Hurricane Andrew in July 1992.

⁷³ Tactical Air Command Deputy Director for Plans. "Composite Wing Philosophy Briefing." Report no. M-U 41737-739 (Langley AFB, Va.: Tactical Air Command, July 1991), 2.

The Air Force designed the Mountain Home AFB force projection composite wing to rapidly deploy to regional crises.⁷⁴ The missions of force projection composite wing include; offensive and defensive counter air, air interdiction, intelligence, command, control, and communications. The composite wing is also designed to be capable of suppression of enemy air defenses, aerial refueling, and electronic combat.⁷⁵ The Pope AFB and Moody AFB composite wings were designed to be capable of air-land force projection in support of the Army's rapid deployment forces.⁷⁶ The air-land wings were tasked with close air support, air base ground defense, surveillance and reconnaissance, airlift and airdrop.⁷⁷ The Pope AFB and Moody AFB wings were primarily in support of the Army's rapid reaction force, while the Mountain Home wing was primarily designed to be able to deploy regional crises without ground forces.

Organizational Leadership Model

Using the chief of staff organizational leadership model, I will examine General McPeak's leadership by assessing the input variables that initiated the composite wing structure and the output variables to assess the organizational outcome of those actions.

Input Variables

McPeak's vision for the resurrection of the composite wing began to develop when he was commander of Pacific Air Forces. During this period, he wrote an article titled "For the Composite Wing."⁷⁸ The article was written when there appeared no likelihood that McPeak would be chief of staff. General Mike Dugan had recently been selected chief of staff and McPeak was entering his thirty-third year of service. When selected to replace General Dugan as chief of staff, McPeak's article was at Air University awaiting publication in the next issue of *Air Power Journal*. General McPeak immediately requested the withdrawal of the article, so as not to bring undue influence on the idea of composite wings. He believed the idea of composite wings needed examination openly and objectively within the Air Force, but was concerned that

⁷⁴ James W. Canan, "Gunfighter Country (Air Force's First Composite Wing)." *Air Force Magazine*, October 1992, 24-30.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 24-30.

⁷⁶ BG Bobby O. Floyd, "Air Land Composite Wing." *Field Artillery*, October 1993, 9-11.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 9-11.

⁷⁸ Gen. Merrill A. McPeak, "For the Composite Wing." *Airpower Journal*, Fall 1990, 4-12.

his anticipated elevation to become professional head of the Air Force might unduly prejudice the argument. At the urging of Lt. General Charles G. Boyd, Air University Commander, however General McPeak allowed *Air Power Journal* to publish the article in its fall 1990 edition.⁷⁹ Throughout the debate that ensued around the resurrection of composite wings, McPeak maintained the highest level of integrity.

After his selection as chief of staff, McPeak and the Secretary of the Air Force articulated their vision for the Air Force with a new mission statement—*Global Reach, Global Power*. *Global Reach, Global Power* was intended to promote the inherent qualities of airpower: responsiveness, speed, range, and flexibility.⁸⁰ McPeak designed the force projection composite wing to react to unexpected and uncertain situations around the world. The composite wing concept placed a premium on speed, mobility, and lethality—getting to the theater quickly and being flexible enough to address a range of operational challenges.

Of all the reorganization actions McPeak initiated during his tenure as chief of staff, the resurrection of the composite wing was the most controversial. McPeak responded to criticism from Air Force service members, the press, General Accounting Office, and the congress. The primary criticism centered on the cost differential of permanently formed composite wings during a period of reduced Air Force appropriations. Although relentlessly subjected to criticism during his four years as chief of staff, McPeak continued with the reorganization actions he believed were in the best interest of the Air Force.

During a congressional hearing on the composite wing structure in 1993, McPeak testified as follows: “The question, really, that interest[s] me is why are we involved in what amounts to a question of whose judgment is correct on how to organize and use air forces?”⁸¹ Although McPeak displayed the moral courage to continue down the path and created his force projection composite wings, he displayed tenacity in the face of overwhelming evidence that the cost and effectiveness of permanently formed composite wings were not feasible.

Prior to creating the composite wing, General McPeak did not adequately observe, analyze, or assess the internal situation and external environment. McPeak recognized that there would be fewer US bases overseas and that the Air Force would have to be capable of rapidly

⁷⁹ Ibid., 4.

⁸⁰ Gen. Merrill A. McPeak, *Selected Works 1990–1994*, (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1995), 144.

deploying mission capable force packages worldwide. These force packages would have to be capable of responding to various contingencies upon arrival in the theater. McPeak believed that his force projection composite wing would be the spearhead of that capability.

McPeak's diagnosis of the external environment recognized the need for an organizational change in the Air Force. The diversity of future threats facing the Air Force coupled with declining budgets and a force primarily based in the United States, forced the service to focus on rapidly deployable forces. Threat assessment during this period resulted in the need to respond to small, short-notice, regional conflicts rather than the lesser campaigns associated with the cold war. During this period, the Air Force was also dealing with substantial reductions in military spending, domestic and overseas basing, and a significant reduction of its force structure.⁸²

McPeak failed to properly analyze and assess the composite wing concept before he initiated organizational changes to create them. The five cases the Air Force used to stress the advantages of composite wings highlighted the advantages and combat effectiveness of composite force training, not of peacetime composite force basing. The Air Force also failed to assess the impact on a squadron's combat effectiveness by removing it from a unitary wing structure. The Air Force needed to explore options other than the composite wing that would not have the added basing and infrastructure expenses.⁸³

McPeak failed to identify key components of the analogies he used to argue for the effectiveness of composite forces. Significant differences exist between the Navy's carrier air wing and McPeak's composite wing. The carrier air wing cited by the Air Force failed to highlight that while on shore, the Navy's aircraft squadrons are home-based in a unitary wing structure. It is only during the spin-up period for a six-month cruise that the carrier air wing trains as an integrated unit. While at sea, the carrier air wing has similar functions to those of the Air Force's composite wing concept, but when at home station, they are not similar at all.

⁸¹ Air Force Times, 31 May 1993.

⁸² Krisinger, Chris J., Maj. "Carrier Air Wing for the Air Force—Challenges for the Composite Wing." *Airpower Journal*, Spring 1992, 32.

⁸³ Other options included: large force composite deployment and training exercises, an increase in the number of large force training exercises on instrumented ranges, an adjustment of annual training requirements to include more large force events, and an increase in funding for dissimilar combat training exercises.

The two provisional composite wing (PCW) analogies (7440th PCW and 4404th PCW) demonstrated that the Air Force could effectively form deployed composite forces from previously separated unitary wings. Historically, deployed composite force wings had demonstrated the effectiveness of a deployed force consisting of a wide variety of aircraft under the control of one commander.⁸⁴ Additionally, they demonstrated the value of annual large force composite training exercises.⁸⁵ The 7440th and 4404th PCWs were comprised of aircraft squadrons deployed from various US or overseas bases, and several of the 4404th PCW aircraft were not collocated in theater. Although the 4404th operated under one command structure, mission packages were assembled from several locations throughout the area of operations. This demonstrates the ability of the Air Force to assemble composite forces effectively from several locations to conduct combat operations. Additionally, the forces deployed to Southwest Asia usually only served 90 to 120 days before returning to their home base. Every three to four months, new squadrons rotated in and out of theater, yet they were still able to become part of an effective integrated combat unit. According to Air Combat Command, having aircraft at several operating locations in theater (SWA) has not presented any significant problems.⁸⁶

General McPeak often referred to the Composite Air Strike Force activated in 1955 as the forerunner to the force composite projection wings he advocated. Closer examination of their experience would have indicated they did not support his argument for resurrection of the composite wing. The CASF was designed to deploy rapidly as a composite force under one commander. The Air Force created the CASF shortly after the Korean War when US policy was shifting from massive retaliation to flexible response.⁸⁷ However, the CASF did not own any aircraft. Ninth and 12th Air Forces provided aircraft to 19th Air Force, which was responsible for planning, deployment and employment of CASF forces. During this period, 19th Air Force had difficulty assembling and training the CASF forces during peacetime, and the various units had competing schedules and agendas. In 1973, under budgetary pressures and internal resistance,

⁸⁴ BG Lee A. Downer, "The Composite Wing in Combat." *Airpower Journal*, Winter 1991, 4-16.

⁸⁵ The Air Force conducts several large force composite and combined training exercises annually at Nellis AFB and at various overseas locations.

⁸⁶ United States General Accounting Office, 21.

⁸⁷ Warren A. Trest, *Air Force Roles and Missions: A History*, (Washington D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1998), 180-6.

the Air Force disestablished both 19th Air Force and the CASF.⁸⁸ The CASF forces were not collocated, and they did not properly organize and train for their deployments. If anything, the CASF served as an example of how not to organize and train a rapid reaction composite force. The benefits of the CASFs for contingency operations could not make up for the inability to organize, train, and equip the forces in peacetime. McPeak also failed to recognize the value of annual composite force training exercises.

These exercises demonstrate the advantage of “training the way you are going to fight.” The Air Force conducts several large force composite training exercises every year. On average, each squadron in the combat air forces participates in at least two exercises per year. Numerous commanders and aircrew members who participated in the Gulf War highlighted the experience their units gained during these annual large force composite training exercises. Although composite wings had the opportunity to train with composite forces more regularly than unitary wings, the level of training does not approach the intensity experienced at large force composite exercises. The composite wing structure also provided considerably less capability than the deployed provisional composite wings or the forces that participate in composite force training exercises (see table 1).

McPeak also failed to consider the potential negative influence on fighter squadrons by taking them out of a unitary wing structure and placing them in a composite wing structure. The composite wing structure could actually diminish the combat effectiveness of aircrew in fighter (F-15C, F-15E, F-16, A-10) squadrons by eliminating the weapon system specific tactics cross-flow prevalent in unitary wings. Although there are known benefits to the dissimilar aircraft training conducted in composite wings, there are tactical-level tradeoffs between the two wing structures. The Air Force did not address this area during the transition to a composite wing structure.

McPeak also did not properly plan for or develop an appropriate strategy for their actions in the implementation of force projection composite wings. The Air Force was adjusting to the budget and personnel reductions based on the post-cold war environment. From 1991 to 1995, the Air Force budget declined steadily. The Air Force budget fell from over \$91.2 billion to an average of \$77.3 billion. According to a RAND study conducted in 1991, the additional cost per

⁸⁸ Futrell, *Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, vol. 1, 1907-1960*, 611-12.

composite wing included an initial investment of \$23.8 million, plus a recurring annual cost of \$1.9 million.⁸⁹ In April 1991, Tactical Air Command estimated the cost of improvements to the existing Mountain Home AFB infrastructure would be at least \$42.1 million, and that figure would rise to \$67.6 million if bombers were included in the wing.⁹⁰ The cost of converting several wings to the composite wing structure thus would prove impractical in an era of declining budgets.

The RAND study also highlighted several operational issues that required resolution before the Air Force could achieve the full potential of composite wings. These issues included the role of composite wing basing in the United States, the political constraints that could arise from basing composite wings overseas, the constraints imposed by the existing base-level infrastructure, the changes to existing operations and intelligence training, the implementation of mission type orders, and the integration of unitary and composite wings in both peace and war.⁹¹ McPeak did not adequately address these issues before creating the composite wings at Mountain Home AFB and Pope AFB.

McPeak's plan failed to implement his vision for a fully capable force projection composite wing. See table 1 for a comparison of the aircraft the Air Force planned for Mountain Home AFB and Pope AFB⁹² compared to those forces that typically participated in composite force exercises and deployed overseas in a provisional composite wing.

Table 1. Comparison of Composite Force Structures

Capabilities	Mountain Home AFB Planned	Pope AFB Planned	Composite Force Exercises	Provisional Composite Wings ⁹³
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⁸⁹ RAND Corporation. "Composite Wings: Needs, Costs, and Options." Report no. M-U 30352-1, RAND Report no. R-4117-AF (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1992), vi.

⁹⁰ Barbara Opall, "TAC Officials Say Composite Wing Proposal Is Prohibitively Expensive." *Defense News*, 17 June 1991, 12.

⁹¹ RAND Study, vii-viii.

⁹² The plan for a composite wing at Moody AFB was delayed indefinitely because aircraft from Homestead AFB relocated to Moody after Hurricane Andrew in July 1992.

⁹³ The composite force assets in SWA were not collocated, but they did operate under one wing commander.

Air-to-Ground	X	X	X	X
Air-to-Air	X	X	X	X
Bombers	X ⁹⁴		X	X ⁹⁵
Tankers	X		X	X
ISR ⁹⁶			X	X
Electronic Jammer ⁹⁷			X	X
AWACS ⁹⁸	X ⁹⁹		X	X
SEAD ¹⁰⁰			X	X
Transports ¹⁰¹		X	X	X
CSAR ¹⁰²			X	X

Source: United States General Accounting Office. *Air Force Organization: More Assessment Needed Before Implementation Force Projection Composite Wings*. Report no. M-U 41026-147 93-44 (Washington, D.C.: Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, May 1993), 27.

The air intervention composite wing at Mountain Home AFB was designed with fewer capabilities than forces that participate in composite force training or deployed provisional composite wings in SWA.

The concept of operations for the composite wings did not plan to collocate all the capabilities required for a typical deployed composite force or even the capabilities included in large force composite training exercises. Consequently, these new composite wings were unable

⁹⁴ Bombers were not planned to be collocated at Mountain Home AFB.

⁹⁵ Bomber presence overseas is not constant and they often planned to employ from the conus to theater.

⁹⁶ Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR).

⁹⁷ After the Air Force retired the EF-111 fleet, the Navy's EA-6B assumed the role of electronic jamming.

⁹⁸ Airborne Warning and Control (AWACS).

⁹⁹ Three AWACS aircraft and crews were planned to go TDY to Mountain Home AFB for 3-month periods.

¹⁰⁰ Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD).

¹⁰¹ Intra-theater airlift assets only.

¹⁰² Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR).

to train the way they were going to fight. In addition to aircraft capability limitations, the plan for composite wings did not take into account the lack of training range availability for large force composite exercises.

McPeak's implementation also did not properly coordinate the air-land composite wing at Pope AFB with the Army. According to Army officials, The Air Force did not consult with the Army before the decision to base a composite wing at Pope AFB. The Air Force unilaterally decided to place an air-land composite wing at Pope AFB without requesting information from the Army.¹⁰³ Before June 1992¹⁰⁴, Pope AFB had been a Military Airlift Command installation with a special mission for the Army. The base provided airlift training for the Army's rapid reaction deployment forces at Fort Bragg.

Output Variables

Force projection composite wings did not significantly increase the combat capability of the Air Force. The organizational step seemed to represent a positive step in maintaining future combat readiness while the Air Force decreased from 33 fighter wings to 26. In theory, the composite wing supported the concept of organizing and training the way the service intends to fight. In reality, the peacetime US based composite wing structure did not support the way the Air Force was going to future conflicts. As noted in table 1, the composite force wings did not have the required force structure to rapidly deploy combat forces to regions with significant air defense systems.

Additionally, both Mountain Home AFB and Pope AFB training ranges were incapable of supporting the number of aircraft needed for realistic large force composite training. Although other training ranges were available to do large force exercises, their availability would limit the composite wing's large force training opportunities.¹⁰⁵ The structure proposed by the Air Force for force projection composite wings lacked the capability to deploy to an area requiring suppression of enemy air defenses or the ability to attack heavily defended targets. According to a July 1991 operational concept briefing, the Mountain Home composite wing would be capable of "autonomous, self-sustained, 24 hour conventional operations for up 7 days

¹⁰³ United States General Accounting Office, 35-7.

¹⁰⁴ In June 1992, Pope AFB transferred from the former Military Airlift Command to Air Combat Command.

¹⁰⁵ United States General Accounting Office, 31.

in areas where *enemy air defenses are limited*. ”¹⁰⁶ Unfortunately, many likely adversaries of the United States have very sophisticated air defense systems.

The Air Force believed the new composite wings would provide an advantage over the way it historically deployed and operated rapid-reaction force packages. Historically during a rapid-reaction force deployment, unitary wings would disperse to deployed locations along functional lines. Composite wings were designed to deploy either as a whole unit or tailored down for a specific contingency operation. The composite wing reorganization, however, did not provide a significant advantage in training or combat effectiveness over traditional provisional wings created with aircraft from unitary wings.

The argument for peacetime composite wings rests on the premise that their composition, collocated basing, and training will enable them to deploy to a future crisis location more rapidly and efficiently than could unitary wings. However, the planned composite wing structure did not include the aircraft capabilities required for a complete composite force. The most notable deficiency was the lack of electronic jamming, suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD), intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), and combat search and rescue (CSAR) aircraft capabilities. Additionally, the Air Force did not plan the bomber and airborne warning and control (AWACS) aircraft to be collocated with the Mountain Home wing. The planned organizational structure would require additional aircraft capability and augmentation to deploy to areas around the world.

The composite wing organizational structure also did not add to the professional competence of the service to execute the tasks required by the operational environment. Three characteristics essentially distinguish composite wing concept from traditional monolithic wings: the permanent collocation of a variety of aircraft and capabilities under one commander; the opportunity for aircrews and command personnel to continually train, test, and evaluate composite force concepts and procedures; and the incorporation of an enhanced, deployable operations center and planning element with the wing. The Mountain Home wing did not have the aircraft capability to enable autonomous operations unless they deployed to extremely low threat areas. The lack of aircraft capabilities coupled with training range limitations prevented the composite wing from training with the force structure required for the typical attack

¹⁰⁶ Tactical Air Command Deputy Director for Plans. “Composite Wing Philosophy Briefing.” Report no. M-U 41737-739 (Langley AFB, Va.: Tactical Air Command, July 1991), 2.

missions. Although composite wings accomplish dissimilar aircraft training, they did not routinely train at the level of large force exercises.

The opportunity for collocated aircraft to practice realistic composite force procedures routinely during peacetime should result in deployed wings making fewer and smaller wartime mission planning and execution related errors. Additionally, composite wings tended to enhance esprit and unit cohesion personnel in composite wings. An enhanced operations center in the wing should result in the commander's capacity for independent action after deployment if contact is lost with higher headquarters. Enhanced operations center include capabilities as battle management; mission planning, target analysis, intelligence gathering and analysis, and battle damage assessment. Because of these capabilities, composite wings would be able to operate with mission type orders¹⁰⁷ versus a daily air tasking order.¹⁰⁸ In the post cold-war environment, the likelihood the Air Force executing combat operations with mission type orders instead of a daily tasking order seems improbable. The political and operational constraints placed on any regional conflict would more than likely preclude the use of mission type orders.

Analysis of General McPeak's Leadership

General McPeak's vision for composite wings was flawed in two respects. First, permanently formed composite wings did not provide a significant advantage in training or combat effectiveness over provisional composite wings that were formed from squadrons maintained in unitary wings. Second, the cost differential of permanently formed composite wings could not be accommodated in reduced Air Force appropriations. McPeak's implementation of composite wings was flawed because he was unable to form a "true" composite wing; he was only able to amalgamate selective combat functions. In theory, the composite wing was a useful concept if one can achieve the organization structure required.

¹⁰⁷ Mission type orders are issued by a higher headquarters and direct a unit to perform a mission without specifying how it is to be accomplished. The goal of a mission type order is to provide unit commanders with the "big picture" of the theater commander's priorities, objectives, and campaign plan. This order is designed to allow a commander to act without waiting for orders if action is necessary and even to justify his acting contrary to orders if the orders are inconsistent with the situation.

¹⁰⁸ An air tasking order provides detailed instructions to each unit. The daily tasking order contains the missions for all the air components in the theater. The order answers the questions of who does what, where, and when and includes targets, times on target, ordnance loads, routes

Unfortunately, the major impediment to implementing the composite wing force structure was cost. If the composite wing's combat capability significantly exceeded the capability of a deployed composite force built from traditional unitary wings, it might have justified the additional cost. Experience has shown the Air Force had demonstrated the ability to deploy forces overseas and create highly effective provisional composite force wings. The operational benefits of peacetime conus based composite wings did not justify the additional cost of a fully equipped composite wing during this period of declining budgets.

and procedures, identification friend or foe codes and frequencies, air refueling times, altitudes, contact points, rules of engagement, as well as any special instructions.

Chapter 5

The Creation of the Objective Wing

One Base, One Wing, One Boss!

General Merrill A. McPeak

Historical Background

From its creation as separate service in 1947, the Air Force has been experimenting with a variety of organizational structures. On many occasions, the service based its organizational structure on economic concerns rather than operational issues or mission effectiveness.¹⁰⁹ Historically, the basic unit in the Air Force for generating and employing combat airpower has been the wing. The wing is the primary war-fighting echelon.

Before McPeak's initiation of the objective wing, the organization of a typical wing included three deputies and a combat support group commander, often called the base commander. The wing commander, vice-wing commander, base commander, and all three deputies were colonels. Below the four deputy commanders was an array of operational and support squadrons.¹¹⁰

Immediately after becoming chief of staff, General McPeak launched a restructuring plan that reflected his vision of "one base, one wing, one boss."¹¹¹ His intent was to reorganize the Air Force along operational lines with the goal of improving the Air Force's combat capability as an integrated whole.

In 1991, General McPeak initiated fundamental change at the wing level that was

¹⁰⁹ For the history of early Air Force wing organizational structure see: Lt Col Gary Sheets, "A History of Wing-Base Organization and Considerations for Change." Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air War College, April 1978.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 104.

the foundation of his “one base, one wing, one boss” organizational concept.¹¹² The purpose of this change was to strengthen the wing commander by making him accountable for all the activities and missions that occurred on the base. The objective wing structure thus departed from “stovepipe” organizations that reported off-base to authorities other than the installation commander. The increased responsibility placed on the wing commanders in the new objective wing structure also led to the elevation of wing commanders from the rank of colonel to the rank of brigadier general. Figure 8 shows the typical wing structure before the reorganization.




Figure 8. Typical Wing Structure before Reorganization (From Official Records of USAF Chief of Staff, Briefing Covering All Areas of Air Force Reorganization, 01 Jan 94, K168.03-610, in USAF Collection, AFHRA, 6)

Instead of having a wing commander with a subordinate base commander, the wing commander would now become the overall installation commander. The traditional tri-deputy structure consisting of deputy commanders for operations, maintenance, and resource management would also be fundamentally changed.

General McPeak directed realignment of these three organizations into two

¹¹¹ James W. Canan, “One Base, One Wing, One Boss.” *Air Force Magazine*, August 1991, 17–19.

¹¹² Gen Merrill A. McPeak, *Selected Works 1990–1994*, (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1995), 103-13.

groups—the operations group and the logistics group. He also redesignated the base commander and the hospital commander as the support group commander and medical group commander, respectively. The officers heading these new groups would now be commanders instead of deputies.¹¹³

General McPeak’s intent was to strengthen the chain of command. Commanders would now work for commanders. Under the objective wing structure, the squadron commanders reported directly to the group commander. Under the old system, squadron commanders reported directly to the wing commander. Figure 9 shows the typical objective wing structure after the reorganization.




Figure 9. Objective Wing Organizational Structure (From Official Records of USAF Chief of Staff, Briefing Covering All Areas of Air Force Reorganization, 01 Jan 94, K168.03-610, in USAF Collection, AFHRA, 6-9)

General McPeak’s view of the group commander’s role can be summed up as follows: “The ops group commander envisioned is a warrior all the way. ‘He’s not a staff

¹¹³ McPeak, *Selected Works 1990–1994*, 106-7.

officer, he's a commander, a walking-around leader who doesn't have to sit in his office supervising staff activities."¹¹⁴

One of the most dramatic changes that occurred in the objective wing structure was the realignment of flight-line maintenance under the operational flying squadron commander. McPeak's intent was to replace the existing operations—maintenance relationship with clear lines of command. In short, McPeak wanted to organize the operational flying squadron in peacetime as it was intended to operate in wartime.¹¹⁵

Figure 10 shows the new objective squadron organizational structure.




Figure 10. Objective Squadron Organizational Structure (From Gen Merrill A. McPeak, *Selected Works 1990–1994*, Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1995, 108)

Organizational Leadership Model

Using the chief of staff organizational leadership model, I will examine General McPeak's leadership by assessing the input variables that initiated the objective wing structure and the output variables to assess the organizational outcome of those actions.

Input Variables

As with the other reorganization actions he initiated, McPeak displayed integrity. McPeak's vision for the objective wing was embodied in his one base, one wing, one

¹¹⁴ Canan, "One Base, One Wing, One Boss," 19.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 17.

boss organizational concept. He wanted to combine responsibility, authority, and capability throughout the wing chain of command. McPeak had the courage to reorganize the wing structure because that was his vision to keep the Air Force the world's best air force into the twenty-first century.¹¹⁶ He aimed to flatten the command structure and force accountability and responsibility down to the squadron commander.

During the objective wing reorganization, General McPeak accurately observed, analyzed, and assessed both the internal situation and the external environment. McPeak saw the wing restructuring as a means of reducing overhead and complying with the demands of a reduced budget, but money and manpower were secondary considerations. Combat capability came first. McPeak stated: "It doesn't make any difference that we are the world's best air force or that we demonstrated in the Gulf War just how good we are. We are going to have to change because our competition will change and so will our position relative to that competition. I'm dedicated to making sure that we control the change, that we change because it makes good operational sense to us."¹¹⁷

McPeak developed a strategy and took appropriate action to manipulate the wing organizational structure. Within a few months of taking over as chief of staff, General McPeak developed his plan to restructure the Air Force with his objective wing.¹¹⁸ His basic strategy for the objective wing reflected his desire that all the activity on an installation be under one commander. He also restructured the groups below the wing commander. Under the objective wing organizational structure, the operations group fights the war, the logistics group supports the war, and the support group fights the base.¹¹⁹

General McPeak first briefed his objective wing structure to Air Force senior leadership at the Corona South Conference in February 1991.¹²⁰ The briefing focused on tactical fighter wings in general and the fighter wing logistical structure in particular. It

¹¹⁶ McPeak, *Selected Works 1990–1994*, 113.

¹¹⁷ Canan, "One Base, One Wing, One Boss," 17.

¹¹⁸ McPeak, *Selected Works 1990–1994*, 67-129.

¹¹⁹ Official Records of USAF Chief of Staff, Briefing Covering All Areas of Air Force Reorganization, 01 Jan 94, K168.03-610, in USAF Collection, AFHRA, 6.

¹²⁰ Dodson, James D, et al. "Leadership Development in the Objective Squadron." Research Report no. 96-201 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Command and Staff College, 1996), 11.

discussed organizing for combat, replacing functional perspectives with command responsibilities, streamlining, and enhancing combat capability. The normal peacetime structure for fighter squadrons and their associated maintenance organizations provided for two different organizations under separate deputy commanders. During mobilization for war, the Air Force planned to integrate operations and maintenance into a single fighting unit. By June of 1991, the entire Air Force was implementing the objective wing structure.¹²¹

Output Variables

The objective wing reorganization increased the capacity of the Air Force to react to the demands of the operational environment. McPeak designed the objective wing to reduce overhead, enhance the chain of command, and streamline the organizational structure. One of the general principles of the objective wing structure was that all base activity comes under the wing commander. Previously, weather, communications, and other support agencies on base reported to off-base authorities. The objective wing eliminated all but a few of these tenant organizations.¹²² Under the new organizational structure, the wing commander has the responsibility, authority, and the capability to accomplish the wing's operational mission.

The objective squadron under the objective wing organizational structure increased the wing's ability to mobilize and deploy to combat as an integrated unit. No longer would operational flying squadrons have an organizational structure in peacetime that did not mirror their wartime organizational structure. The objective squadron structure increased the wings combat capability. Under the objective wing structure, a squadron would operate in peacetime with the organizational structure used during wartime. The wing became more mission capable and more deployable. The objective wing structure also created a mission support squadron for each group.

The creation of new mission support squadron in each group also increased the wing's ability to adapt rapidly to the operational environment it would encounter upon

¹²¹ **Ibid., 12.**

¹²² The Air Force Audit Agency and the Office of Special Investigations (OSI) still reported to an off-base authority.

deployment.¹²³ This new squadron absorbed the daily staff functions previously under the deputy commander. For example, the Operations Support Squadron, now under the Operations Group, assumed responsibility for weapons and tactics, analysis, intelligence, weather, airfield operations, scheduling, and training. The creation of the support squadron allowed the group commanders to concentrate on their principal purpose—flying and fighting.¹²⁴

The objective wing structure enhanced the ability of the Air Force to ensure sustained coordination and cooperation. It streamlined the organization and strengthened the chain of command by replacing deputies with commanders. This structure had commanders working for commanders and provided a clear chain of command through the wing. By placing sortie-production capability under the operations group and intermediate maintenance under the logistics group, the objective wing structure created direct accountability within the operations group and cross-functional accountability between the operations and logistics group. This organizational structure gave the operations group and flying squadron the responsibility for mission accomplishment.

The change that had the most influence on the wing's operational capability was the objective squadron. The unification of operations and maintenance under the operational squadron commander, clearly established the responsibility, authority, and capability for the squadron commander to effectively accomplish the mission. McPeak highlighted the challenges for the commanders when he stated:

“A squadron commander, a flight-line operational squadron commander, no longer has 65 college-graduate volunteers under his command. He has got 300 guys, most of whom are not college graduates, trying to do something ugly out there with airplanes. The lieutenant colonel now has a completely different problem, and he is better prepared to handle the kind of intellectual challenge that high command involves. So we are trying to make people flexible, by which I mean break the mold on static thinking.”¹²⁵

¹²³ For a study on the new operations support squadron see: Lt Col James S. Davis, “The Operations Support Squadron in the Objective Wing.” Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air War College, October 1995.

¹²⁴ Canan, “One Base, One Wing, One Boss,” 19.

¹²⁵ Oral History Interview of General Merrill McPeak by Dr. George M. Watson, Jr. and Major Robert White, 19 December 1994. Typed transcript, K239.0512-2138 C. 1, in USAF Collection, AFHRA, 7.

Under the old system when a flying squadron mobilized for war, the squadron commander assumed the responsibility for flight-line maintenance under field conditions. The peacetime structure did not match the wartime organizational structure. McPeak's objective squadron eliminated the peacetime/wartime dichotomy, thus facilitating deployment and combat capability.

The objective wing enhanced the Air Force's ability to execute the tasks required by the operational environment. The objective wing reorganization definitely focused the wing on operations. It also reorganized most support functions under their respective group commanders. The reorganization also moved functional areas required for the wing commander to operate effectively into his staff. These included a vice-wing commander, public affairs office, safety office, historian, protocol office, judge advocate, and chaplain. There were, however, certain deficiencies of the objective wing structure. Operational squadron commanders were not fully prepared to assume the responsibilities of objective squadrons, and certain special operations and air mobility units could not properly integrate maintenance at the squadron level.

Whether the objective wing structure increased or decreased the effectiveness of flight-line maintenance operations and supervision is debatable.¹²⁶ The objective wing structure also did not seem to work as effectively in either special operations or airlift squadrons. In these types of flying organizations, the squadron rarely deployed as an integrated unit; and the creation of separate flight-line maintenance organizations for each squadron proved inefficient.

The creation of objective squadron also created a leadership challenge for the operational squadron commanders.¹²⁷ Operational squadron commanders went from leading fewer than one hundred airmen, mostly officers, to anywhere from 300 to 500. This change created a significant strain on the leadership skills and training of the

¹²⁶ For an analysis on the affects of the objective wing on maintenance see: Eaton, Maj Theodore W., Maj Nancy E. Frye, Maj Larry C. Hills, Maj Annie M. McLeod, and Maj Glenn Waddell. "The Objective Wing Maintenance Structure—A Relic of the Past and Innovation for the Future." Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Command and Staff College, June 1994.

¹²⁷ For a study on leadership in the objective squadron see: Dodson, James D, et al. "Leadership Development in the Objective Squadron." Research Report no. 96-201. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air Command and Staff College, 1996.

squadron commanders. Very few flying squadron commanders had any experience with maintenance personnel other than their crew chiefs, and now they were responsible for them. The Air Force seems to have done a poor job of preparing its officers for operational squadron command. One flying squadron commander operating under the new objective wing structure stated that he “was certainly not trained for the job beforehand even though [he] had attended the obligatory squadron commander’s course.”¹²⁸

Although under the objective wing structure commanders would be better prepared for future command opportunities, it would take a few years for the Air Force to properly transition to the new organizational structure. General McPeak stated that “given their broaden command responsibilities, squadron commanders will have a much more different challenge of leadership than they do now. They will be well trained for the next step up the rung and beyond, because they’ll be getting a much bigger picture of how the Air Force actually runs.”¹²⁹ Although the experience and challenges of operational squadron command helped to develop future Air Force leaders, the service failed to identify a leadership track or training program that adequately prepared its squadron commanders for the challenges of command.¹³⁰

Analysis of General McPeak’s Leadership

General McPeak’s objective wing structure was revolutionary in nature and represented a vision shared by senior Air Force leadership at the time.¹³¹ The objective wing structure achieved in practice what General McPeak envisioned in his one base, one wing, one boss organizational vision. The objective wing has unquestionably simplified the chain of command, flattened the overall organizational structure, and given more responsibility, authority, capability, and accountability to the field commanders. The objective wing has dramatically improved the Air Force’s ability to deploy highly

¹²⁸ Lt Col Walter L. Burns, “The Objective Wing: A Critical Analysis.” Report no. M-U 43117 B9673a (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air War College, April 1995), 21.

¹²⁹ Ibid., 22.

¹³⁰ For a study on leadership in today’s Air Force see: Evans, Carl D. “Growing Tomorrow’s Commanders in Today’s Environment.” Research Report no. 98-094. Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air War College, 1998.

effective combat airpower more efficiently.

According to General Russell E. Dougherty, “Our service should not permit its internal organizational structure to become institutionalized that these organizations take on inviolable lives of their own. We must not let those who would resist change cause us to abdicate the Air Force traditions of adaptability and flexibility.”¹³² The objective wing organization exercises the characteristics that over the years have made the Air Force effective. Adaptability and flexibility, as described by General Dougherty, are the keys to our success.

The objective wing structure strengthened the operational wing. It clarified the chain of command, combined authority and responsibility, and streamlined operations and maintenance. The reorganization eliminated most of the “stovepipe” agencies and realigned support functions directly under the operational commander. Airplanes now belonged to the operational commander, not to the maintenance. General McPeak’s objective wing promoted an operational focus and increased the Air Force’s combat capability.

¹³¹ Canan, “One Base, One Wing, One Boss,” 18.

¹³² Gen Russell E. Dougherty, “Roots and Wings: A Perspective on Reorganization.” *Airpower Journal*, Summer 1992, 6.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

General Merrill A. McPeak served as the chief of staff of the Air Force from 1990 to 1994. During this tenure, he restructured the Air Force to meet the demands of national security, simultaneously adjusting to the end of the Soviet threat and to decreasing fiscal resources. McPeak led the service through the most radical reorganization the Air Force had seen since its creation in 1947.

This study examined the effectiveness of General McPeak's three major organizational initiatives: restructuring the major commands, forming composite wings, and establishing the objective wing. To evaluate his decisions and actions, this thesis established an organizational leadership model. The central task was to answer the question: Did General McPeak's leadership as chief of staff of the Air Force contribute significantly and positively to the Air Force reorganization? Table 2 below summarizes the evidence related to that question.

Table 2. Summary of CSAF Organizational Leadership Model

Input Variables				Output Variables		
	Leadership Skills	Diagnostic Skills	Action Skills	Adaptability	Integration	Operational Proficiency
MAJCOM Reorganization	+	+	+	+	+	+
Composite Wing	0	-	-	0	0	0
Objective Wing	+	+	+	+	+	+
Reorganization Action: (+) positive effect, (0) neutral effect, (-) negative effect						

The MAJCOM and objective wing reorganizations contributed significantly and positively to the Air Force. On the other hand, the composite wing structure failed to produce the vision intended by General McPeak.

Of all the duties and responsibilities of the chief of staff, determining the organizational structure of the Air Force is one that over which he has the greatest degree of influence. The MAJCOM reorganization enhanced combat capability and improved peacetime efficiency. It eliminated several MAJCOM headquarters staff, consolidated functional activities, and strengthened the senior chain of command. All of this made the Air Force a more streamlined, agile combat organization. The MAJCOM reorganization indeed strengthened Air Force operations in the post-cold war operational environment.

In contrast, McPeak did not properly analyze, plan for, or create the composite wing. The composite wings did not possess the aircraft required for a fully capability composite force. The major impediment to implementing the composite wing force was the cost associated with additional base infrastructure. The composite wing combat capability did not significantly

exceed the capability of a deployed composite force built from traditional unitary wings. The Air Force in the past had demonstrated the ability to deploy forces overseas and create highly effective ad-hoc composite force wings. McPeak did not justify the additional cost of US-based composite wings during a period of declining budgets.

General McPeak's objective wing structure was much more effective. The objective wing strengthened the chain of command; flattened the micro organizational structure; and assigned more authority, responsibility, capability, and accountability to the field commanders. The objective wing dramatically improved the Air Force's ability to deploy highly effective combat airpower more efficiently. It also strengthened leadership and expanded the operational responsibilities of the Air Force officer corps.

Of all the service chiefs during the early 1990s, only General McPeak undertook an all-out reorganization in response to the end of the cold war and reduced service budgets. The magnitude of the organizational changes initiated by McPeak is significant. McPeak had five basic themes to his reorganization of the Air Force:

1. Decentralization of power from headquarters to operating units.
2. Bolstering the authority of lower-echelon commanders.
3. Streamlining the organization by removing links in the chain.
4. Consolidation of operations under one commander.
5. Clarification of functional responsibilities.

McPeak restructured the Air Force for it to remain combat ready in the post cold-war environment.

One can learn several lessons from General McPeak's leadership and reorganization actions. First, the chief of staff's vision, courage, integrity, and willingness to initiate change when needed are essential components to leadership. Second, one must properly observe, analyze, and assess the situation before initiating any major Air Force organizational change. Third, the Air Force must adapt its organizational structure when required by the internal situation and external environment to remain combat effective. Fourth, the chief of staff has the authority and the responsibility to organize the service properly for peacetime efficiencies and wartime combat effectiveness.

Although the composite wing reorganization did not significantly alter or improve the Air Force operational capability, the MAJCOM and objective wing reorganization were highly

effective. General McPeak had significantly and positively improved the overall organization structure of the Air Force. His leadership and vision had positively positioned the Air Force to remain the world's best air force. General McPeak summed up his thoughts in the following statement:

The number one thing [I'm most proud of] would have to be the reorganization of the Air Force. We rebuilt the Air Force top to bottom and changed it in fundamental ways, which I think were important. The basis for all that was a desire on my part to make operations the centerpiece of the organization and to strengthen the role of operations. *Operations is our product*. Basically, I wanted to improve our product. We reorganized, restructured the Air Force top to bottom, and that is probably the most important thing.¹³³

In sum, General Merrill A. McPeak undeniably rebuilt the United States Air Force; and, taken as a whole, the result was positive.

¹³³ Oral History Interview of General Merrill McPeak by Dr. George M. Watson, Jr. and Major Robert White, 19 December 1994. Typed transcript, K239.0512-2138 C. 1, in USAF Collection, AFHRA., 73.

APPENDIX A

US CODE: TITLE 10, SECTION 8033 THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE AIR FORCE

Source: U.S. Code: Title 10, Chapter 805, Section 8033, Chief of Staff, January 2000.

(a)

(1) There is a Chief of Staff of the Air Force, appointed for a period of four years by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, from the general officers of the Air Force. He serves at the pleasure of the President. In time of war or during a national emergency declared by Congress, he may be reappointed for a term of not more than four years.

(2) The President may appoint an officer as Chief of Staff only if:

(A) The officer has had significant experience in joint duty assignments; and

(B) such experience includes at least one full tour of duty in a joint duty assignment as a general officer.

(3) The President may waive paragraph (2) in the case of an officer if the President determines such action is necessary in the national interest.

(b) The Chief of Staff, while so serving, has the grade of general without vacating his permanent grade.

(c) Except as otherwise prescribed by law and subject to section 8013(f) of this title, the Chief of Staff performs his duties under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of the Air Force and is directly responsible to the Secretary.

(d) Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of the Air Force, the Chief of Staff shall:

(1) Preside over the Air Staff.

(2) Transmit the plans and recommendations of the Air Staff to the Secretary and advise the Secretary with regard to such plans and recommendations.

(3) After approval of the plans or recommendations of the Air Staff by the Secretary, act as the agent of the Secretary in carrying them into effect.

(4) Exercise supervision, consistent with the authority assigned to commanders of unified or specified combatant commands under chapter 6 of

this title, over such of the members and organizations of the Air Force as the Secretary determines.

(5) Perform the duties prescribed for him by section 171 of this title and other provisions of law.

(6) Perform such other military duties, not otherwise assigned by law, as are assigned to him by the President, the Secretary of Defense, or the Secretary of the Air Force.

(e)

(1) The Chief of Staff shall also perform the duties prescribed for him as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under section 151 of this title.

(2) To the extent that such action does not impair the independence of the Chief of Staff in the performance of his duties as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Staff shall inform the Secretary regarding military advice rendered by members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on matters affecting the Department of the Air Force.

(3) Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, the Chief of Staff shall keep the Secretary of the Air Force fully informed of significant military operations affecting the duties and responsibilities of the Secretary.

APPENDIX B

US CODE: TITLE 10, SECTION 8032 THE AIR STAFF: GENERAL DUTIES

Source: U.S. Code: Title 10, Chapter 805 Section 8032, The Air Staff, January 1998.

(a) The Air Staff shall furnish professional assistance to the Secretary, the Under Secretary, and the Assistant Secretaries of the Air Force, and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force.

(b) Under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of the Air Force, the Air Staff shall:

- (1) Subject to subsections (c) and (d) of section 8014 of this title, prepare for such employment of the Air Force, and for such recruiting, organizing, supplying, equipping (including those aspects of research and development assigned by the Secretary of the Air Force), training, servicing, mobilizing, demobilizing, administering, and maintaining of the Air Force, as will assist in the execution of any power, duty, or function of the Secretary or the Chief of Staff.
- (2) Investigate and report upon the efficiency of the Air Force and its preparation to support military operations by combatant commands.
- (3) Prepare detailed instructions for the execution of approved plans and supervise the execution of those plans and instructions.
- (4) As directed by the Secretary or the Chief of Staff, coordinate the action of organizations of the Air Force.
- (5) Perform such other duties, not otherwise assigned by law, as may be prescribed by the Secretary.

APPENDIX C

US CODE: TITLE 10, SECTION 8013 SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

Source: U.S. Code: Title 10, Chapter 805 Section 8013, Secretary of the Air Force, January 1998.

(a)

(1) There is a Secretary of the Air Force, appointed from civilian life by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The Secretary is the head of the Department of the Air Force.

(2) A person may not be appointed as Secretary of the Air Force within five years after relief from active duty as a commissioned officer of a regular component of an armed force.

(b) Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense and subject to the provisions of chapter 6 of this title, the Secretary of the Air Force is responsible for, and has the authority necessary to conduct, all affairs of the Department of the Air Force, including the following functions:

(1) Recruiting.

(2) Organizing.

(3) Supplying.

(4) Equipping (including research and development).

(5) Training.

(6) Servicing.

(7) Mobilizing.

(8) Demobilizing.

(9) Administering (including the morale and welfare of personnel).

(10) Maintaining.

(11) The construction, outfitting, and repair of military equipment.

(12) The construction, maintenance, and repair of buildings, structures, and utilities and the acquisition of real property and interests in real property necessary to carry out the responsibilities specified in this section.

(c) Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Air Force is also responsible to the Secretary of Defense for:

(1) The functioning and efficiency of the Department of the Air Force.

(2) The formulation of policies and programs by the Department of the Air Force that are fully consistent with national security objectives and policies established by the President or the Secretary of Defense.

(3) The effective and timely implementation of policy, program, and budget decisions and instructions of the President or the Secretary of Defense relating to the functions of the Department of the Air Force.

(4) Carrying out the functions of the Department of the Air Force so as to fulfill (to the maximum extent practicable) the current and future operational requirements of the unified and specified combatant commands.

(5) Effective cooperation and coordination between the Department of the Air Force and the other military departments and agencies of the Department of Defense to provide for more effective, efficient, and economical administration and to eliminate duplication.

(6) The presentation and justification of the positions of the Department of the Air Force on the plans, programs, and policies of the Department of Defense.

(7) The effective supervision and control of the intelligence activities of the Department of the Air Force.

(d) The Secretary of the Air Force is also responsible for such other activities as may be prescribed by law or by the President or Secretary of Defense.

(e) After first informing the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Air Force may make such recommendations to Congress relating to the Department of Defense, as he considers appropriate.

(f) The Secretary of the Air Force may assign such of his functions, powers, and duties, as he considers appropriate to the Under Secretary of the Air Force and to the Assistant Secretaries of the Air Force. Officers of the Air Force shall, as directed by the Secretary, report on any matter to the Secretary, the Under Secretary, or any Assistant Secretary.

(g) The Secretary of the Air Force may:

- (1) Assign, detail, and prescribe the duties of members of the Air Force and civilian personnel of the Department of the Air Force.
- (2) Change the title of any officer or activity of the Department of the Air Force not prescribed by law; and (3) prescribe regulations to carry out his functions, powers, and duties under this title.

APPENDIX D

US CODE: TITLE 10, SECTION 151 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Source: U.S. Code: Title 10, Chapter 805 Section 151, Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 1998.

(a) Composition—There are in the Department of Defense the Joint Chiefs of Staff, headed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consist of the following:

- (1) The Chairman.
- (2) The Vice Chairman.
- (3) The Chief of Staff of the Army.
- (4) The Chief of Naval Operations.
- (5) The Chief of Staff of the Air Force.
- (6) The Commandant of the Marine Corps.

(b) Function as Military Advisers—The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense.

- (1) The other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are military advisers to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense as specified in subsections (d) and (e).

(c) Consultation by Chairman.

- (1) In carrying out his functions, duties, and responsibilities, the Chairman shall, as he considers appropriate, consult with and seek the advice of: (A) The other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and (B) the commanders of the unified and specified combatant commands.

- (2) Subject to subsection (d), in presenting advice with respect to any matter to the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman shall, as he considers appropriate, inform the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense, as the case may be, of the range of military advice and opinion with respect to that matter.

(d) Advice and Opinions of Members Other Than Chairman:

- (1) A member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (other than the Chairman) may submit to the Chairman advice or an opinion in disagreement with, or advice

or an opinion in addition to, the advice presented by the Chairman to the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense. If a member submits such advice or opinion, the Chairman shall present the advice or opinion of such member at the same time he presents his own advice to the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense, as the case may be.

(2) The Chairman shall establish procedures to ensure that the presentation of his own advice to the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense is not unduly delayed by reason of the submission of the individual advice or opinion of another member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(e) Advice on Request—The members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, individually or collectively, in their capacity as military advisers, shall provide advice to the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary of Defense on a particular matter when the President, the National Security Council, or the Secretary requests such advice.

(f) Recommendations to Congress—After first informing the Secretary of Defense, a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may make such recommendations to Congress relating to the Department of Defense as he considers appropriate.

(g) Meetings of JCS.

(1) The Chairman shall convene regular meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(2) Subject to the authority, direction, and control of the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman shall:

(A) Preside over the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(B) Provide agenda for the meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (including, as the Chairman considers appropriate, any subject for the agenda recommended by any other member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff).

(C) Assist the Joint Chiefs of Staff in carrying on their business as promptly as practicable.

(D) Determine when issues under consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall be decided.

APPENDIX E

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE BIOGRAPHY GENERAL MERRILL A. MCPEAK

RETIRED EFFECTIVE NOVEMBER 1, 1994

Source: United States Air Force *Biography of General Merrill A. McPeak*. Available from http://www.af.mil/news/biographies/mcpeak_ma.html.

Education

1957 Bachelor of arts degree in economics, San Diego State College
1970 Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Va.
1974 Master's degree in international relations, George Washington University
1974 National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.
1979 The Executive Development Program, University of Michigan Graduate School of Business

Assignments

1. November 1957 - January 1958, student, Officer Preflight Training, Lackland Air Force Base, Texas
2. January 1958 - January 1959, student, pilot training, Hondo Air Base, Texas, and Vance Air Force Base, Okla.
3. February 1959 - December 1959, student, F-100 combat crew training, Luke Air Force Base, Ariz., and Nellis Air Force Base, Nev.
4. December 1959 - August 1961, F-104C fighter pilot, 436th Tactical Fighter Squadron, George Air Force Base, Calif.
5. August 1961 - May 1964, F-100D fighter pilot, 79th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Royal Air Force Station Woodbridge, England
6. May 1964 - August 1965, fighter staff officer, tactical evaluation division, Headquarters 3rd Air Force, South Ruislip Air Station, England
7. September 1965 - December 1966, F-104G instructor pilot, 4443rd Combat Crew Training Squadron; later, F-104G weapons officer, 4510th Combat Crew Training Wing, Luke Air Force Base, Ariz.
8. December 1966 - December 1968, demonstration pilot, U.S. Air Force Air Demonstration Squadron, the Thunderbirds, Nellis Air Force Base, Nev.
9. December 1968 - January 1969, F-100D fighter pilot, 612th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Phu Cat Air Base, Republic of Vietnam
10. January 1969 - August 1969, operations officer, later commander, Operation Commando Sabre (Misty Fast FACs), Phu Cat Air Base, Republic of Vietnam
11. August 1969 - December 1969, chief, standardization and evaluation division, 31st

Tactical Fighter Wing, Tuy Hoa Air Base, Republic of Vietnam

12. January 1970 - July 1970, student, Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Va.
13. August 1970 - August 1973, air operations staff officer, Middle east Division, directorate of plans and policy, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
14. August 1973 - June 1974, student, National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C.
15. June 1974 - April 1975, assistant deputy commander for operations, 1st Tactical Fighter Wing, MacDill Air Force Base, Fla.
16. April 1975 - June 1975, student, French language training (en route for duty as air attaché to Republic of Cambodia), Foreign Service Institute, Washington, D.C.
17. July 1975 - June 1976, military fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, New York City
18. July 1976 - July 1977, commander, 513th Combat Support Group, Royal Air Force Station Mildenhall, England
19. July 1977 - July 1978, vice commander, 406th Tactical Fighter Training Wing, Zaragoza Air Base, Spain
20. July 1978 - February 1980, assistant chief of staff, current operations, Allied Air Forces Central Europe, Boerfink, West Germany
21. February 1980 - June 1981, commander, 20th Tactical Fighter Wing, Royal Air Force Station Upper Heyford, England
22. June 1981 - October 1982, chief of staff, Headquarters U.S. Air Forces in Europe, Ramstein Air Base, West Germany
23. October 1982 - May 1985, deputy chief of staff, plans, Headquarters Tactical Air Command, Langley Air Force Base, Va.
24. May 1985 - June 1987, deputy chief of staff, programs and resources, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
25. June 1987 - July 1988, commander, 12th Air Force and commander, U.S. Southern Command Air Forces, Bergstrom Air Force Base, Texas
26. July 1988 - October 1990, commander in chief, Pacific Air Forces, Hickam Air Force Base, Hawaii
27. October 1990 – November 1994, chief of staff, U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.

Flight Information

Rating: Command pilot, parachutist
 Flight hours: More than 6,000
 Aircraft flown: F-4, F-15, F-16, F-100, F-104, F-111
 Pilot wings from: Germany, Spain, Mexico, Thailand, Yugoslavia France, Israel, Russia, Bulgaria, Venezuela and Poland

Major Awards and Decorations

Distinguished Service Medal
 Silver Star
 Legion of Merit with oak leaf cluster
 Distinguished Flying Cross with oak leaf cluster
 Meritorious Service Medal
 Air Medal with 13 oak leaf clusters

Air Force Commendation Medal with three oak leaf clusters
 Vietnam Service Medal with four service stars
 Republic of Vietnam Gallantry Cross with Palm

Published Articles

"Training and Discipline, Keys to Maximum Performance," TAC ATTACK, August 1968

"Israel: Borders and Security," Foreign Affairs, April 1976

"TAC Air Missions and the Fire Support Coordination Line," Air University Review, Sept. - Oct. 1985

"For the Composite Wing," Air Power Journal, Fall 1990

Effective Dates of Promotion

SecondLieutenant	Jun	19,	1957
FirstLieutenan	May	30,	1959
Captain	Oct	1,	1962
Major	May	20,	1968
LieutenantColonel	Nov	1,	1972
Colonel	Apr	1,	1974
BrigadierGeneral	Jul	1,	1981
MajorGeneral	Oct	1,	1983
Lieutenant General	May	22,	1985
General	Aug	1,	1988

APPENDIX F

MAJOR COMMANDS, FIELD OPERATING AGENCIES AND DIRECT REPORTING UNITS

Source: Organization of the US Air Force. Available from
<http://www.af.mil/news/factsheets/usaf.html>

Major Commands

Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, Va.
Air Education and Training Command, Randolph AFB, Texas
Air Force Materiel Command, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio
Air Force Reserve Command, Robins AFB, Ga.
Air Force Space Command, Peterson AFB, Colo.
Air Force Special Operations Command, Hurlburt Field, Fla.
Air Mobility Command, Scott AFB, Ill.
Pacific Air Forces, Hickam AFB, Hawaii
United States Air Forces in Europe, Ramstein AB, Germany

Field Operating Agencies

Air Force Audit Agency, Washington, D.C.
Air Force Base Conversion Agency, Washington, D.C.
Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence, Brooks AFB, Texas
Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency, Tyndall AFB, Fla.
Air Force Communications Agency, Scott AFB, Ill.
Air Force Cost Analysis Agency, Arlington, Va.
Air Force Flight Standards Agency, Washington, D.C.
Air Force Frequency Management Agency, Arlington, Va.
Air Force Historical Research Agency, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
Air Force History Support Office, Bolling AFB, D.C.
Air Force Inspection Agency, Kirtland AFB, N.M.
Air Force Legal Services Agency, Washington, D.C.
Air Force Logistics Management Agency, Maxwell AFB, Gunter Annex, Ala.
Air Force Manpower and Innovation Agency, Randolph AFB, Texas
Air Force Medical Operations Agency, Bolling AFB, D.C.
Air Force Medical Support Agency, Brooks AFB, Texas
Air Force National Security Emergency Preparedness Office, Washington, D.C.
Air Force News Agency, San Antonio, Texas
Air Force Office of Special Investigations, Andrews AFB, Md.
Air Force Nuclear Weapons and Counter-proliferation Agency, Washington, D.C.
Air Force Operations Group, Washington, D.C.
Air Force Pentagon Communications Agency, Washington, D.C.

Air Force Personnel Center, Randolph AFB, Texas
Air Force Personnel Operations Agency, Washington, D.C.
Air Force Real Estate Agency, Bolling AFB, D.C.
Air Force Review Boards Agency, Washington, D.C.

Field Operating Agencies (Continued)

Air Force Safety Center, Kirtland AFB, N.M.
Air Force Security Forces Center, Kirtland AFB, N.M.
Air Force Services Agency, San Antonio, Texas
Air Force Studies and Analyses, Washington, D.C.
Air Force Technical Applications Center, Patrick AFB, Fla.
Air Force Weather Agency, Offutt AFB, Neb.
Air Intelligence Agency, San Antonio, Texas
Air National Guard Readiness Center, Andrews AFB, Md.

Direct Reporting Units

11th Wing, Bolling AFB, D.C.
Air Force Doctrine Center, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center, Kirtland AFB, N.M.
United States Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colo.

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Volume

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William

Smith Regarding Proposed Reorganization, Volume 20 of 26, 15 Nov 90 through
12 Dec 91, K168.03-133 V.20, in USAF Collection, AFHRA.

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Volume

1 of 25, 25 Oct 90 through 30 Dec 91, K168.03-131V.1, in USAF Collection,
AFHRA.

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James

Mullins Regarding Proposed Organizational Changes, Volume 13 of 25, 21 Nov
90

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Official Records and Correspondence of USAF Chief of Staff, Information Papers from
CSAF

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ACC,

AMC, and USTRATCOM, 01 May 92 through 04 Jun 92, K168.03-222, in USAF
Collection, AFHRA.

Official Records and Correspondence of USAF Chief of Staff, Information Papers from
CSAF

Visit to Maxwell, Speech about Air Force Restructure Plan, 13 Sep 91 through 12
Nov

91, K168.03-194, in USAF Collection, AFHRA.

Official Records of USAF Chief of Staff, Briefing Covering All Areas of Air Force
Reorganization, 01 Jan 94, K168.03-610, in USAF Collection, AFHRA.

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CSAF

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K168.03-588,

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Maxwell AFB

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Volume

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